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PHỤ LỤC 1: BẢNG THỐNG KÊ MÔ TẢ BIẾN NGHIÊN CỨU



Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

zscore

300

23.98102

11.48096

1.32173

62.19548

mp_i1

300

.0660692

.0255972

.04375

.1183333

mp_i2

300

.0854233

.024424

.06375

.1333333

cr

300

.1962818

.0859924

.0885

.3753

fxi

300

1.036094

.0333158

.9913957

1.09083

inf

300

.08424

.0690287

.0063

.2297

sm

300

.20431

.0542346

.12

.298

inc

300

.0176324

.0299349

.0005517

.3610977

gro

300

.0600761

.0052783

.0524737

.0681

lerner

300

.296084

.0839612

.0214135

.608538

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Tác động của chính sách tiền tệ tới rủi ro mất khả năng thanh toán tại các Ngân Hàng Thương Mại Việt Nam - 21



zscore

mp_i1

mp_i2

cr

fxi

inf

sm

inc

gro

lerner ins

zscore

1.0000










mp_i1

0.1203

1.0000









mp_i2

0.1222

0.9993

1.0000








cr

0.1430

-0.2086

-0.2082

1.0000







fxi

0.1461

0.4627

0.4488

0.4813

1.0000






inf

0.1978

0.8018

0.7976

0.1905

0.7298

1.0000





sm

0.0989

-0.1787

-0.1552

0.5685

0.0095

0.0182

1.0000




inc

0.0208

-0.0653

-0.0648

-0.0955

-0.1047

-0.0958

-0.0252

1.0000



gro

-0.1095

-0.3343

-0.3555

0.0328

0.0562

-0.2153

-0.4937

0.0116

1.0000


lerner

0.1612

0.1462

0.1485

0.5026

0.4026

0.3208

0.3448

-0.1788

-0.1120

1.0000

ins

0.1925

0.4753

0.4744

0.7025

0.5432

0.6008

0.3699

-0.1151

-0.2282

0.5134 1.0000


Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM



Group variable: id

Number of obs

=

270

Time variable : nam

Number of groups

=

30

Number of instruments = 12

Obs per group: min

=

9

F(7, 29) = 97.10

avg

=

9.00

Prob > F = 0.000

max

=

9


zscore

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

[95% Conf.

Interval]

zscore







L1.

.7332959

.0349532

20.98

0.000

.6618084

.8047833

mp_i1

-77.6337

24.2307

-3.20

0.003

-127.191

-28.07635

lerner

-67.31281

15.25861

-4.41

0.000

-98.52016

-36.10546

inc

-5.837649

5.310698

-1.10

0.281

-16.69925

5.023949

gro

-4.069882

49.1818

-0.08

0.935

-104.658

96.5182

inf

17.60018

8.508213

2.07

0.048

.1989317

35.00143

ins

142.714

32.37464

4.41

0.000

76.50044

208.9276

_cons

-52.03248

15.46953

-3.36

0.002

-83.67123

-20.39373

Warning: Uncorrected two-step standard errors are unreliable.


Instruments for first differences equation Standard

D.(inc gro L.zscore ins)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) L(1/9).mp_i1 collapsed

Instruments for levels equation Standard

inc gro L.zscore ins

_cons

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.mp_i1 collapsed

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -3.76 Pr > z = 0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -0.79 Pr > z = 0.430

Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 9.13 Prob > chi2 = 0.058 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 6.61 Prob > chi2 = 0.158 (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)


Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: iv(inc gro L.zscore ins)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(1)

=

0.01

Prob >

chi2

=

0.943

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)

=

6.61

Prob >

chi2

=

0.085


Group variable: id

Number of obs

=

270

Time variable : nam

Number of groups

=

30

Number of instruments = 12

Obs per group: min

=

9

F(7, 29) = 97.28

avg

=

9.00

Prob > F = 0.000

max

=

9


zscore

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

[95% Conf.

Interval]

zscore







L1.

.7330487

.0350088

20.94

0.000

.6614476

.8046497

mp_i1ins

-136.0426

41.59345

-3.27

0.003

-221.1108

-50.97448

lerner

-67.88617

15.28354

-4.44

0.000

-99.14452

-36.62782

inc

-6.101499

5.33318

-1.14

0.262

-17.00908

4.806078

gro

.0312943

48.83054

0.00

0.999

-99.83838

99.90096

inf

18.33111

8.571848

2.14

0.041

.7997111

35.86251

ins

150.1159

33.00869

4.55

0.000

82.60551

217.6262

_cons

-56.34188

15.63251

-3.60

0.001

-88.31396

-24.3698

Warning: Uncorrected two-step standard errors are unreliable.


Instruments for first differences equation Standard

D.(inc gro L.zscore ins)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) L(1/9).mp_i1 collapsed

Instruments for levels equation Standard

inc gro L.zscore ins

_cons

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.mp_i1 collapsed

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -3.76 Pr > z = 0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -0.80 Pr > z = 0.426

Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 9.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.061 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 6.28 Prob > chi2 = 0.179 (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)


Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: iv(inc gro L.zscore ins)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(1)

=

0.01 Prob >

chi2

=

0.930

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)

=

6.27 Prob >

chi2

=

0.099

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