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PHỤ LỤC 1: BẢNG THỐNG KÊ MÔ TẢ BIẾN NGHIÊN CỨU
Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | |
zscore | 300 | 23.98102 | 11.48096 | 1.32173 | 62.19548 |
mp_i1 | 300 | .0660692 | .0255972 | .04375 | .1183333 |
mp_i2 | 300 | .0854233 | .024424 | .06375 | .1333333 |
cr | 300 | .1962818 | .0859924 | .0885 | .3753 |
fxi | 300 | 1.036094 | .0333158 | .9913957 | 1.09083 |
inf | 300 | .08424 | .0690287 | .0063 | .2297 |
sm | 300 | .20431 | .0542346 | .12 | .298 |
inc | 300 | .0176324 | .0299349 | .0005517 | .3610977 |
gro | 300 | .0600761 | .0052783 | .0524737 | .0681 |
lerner | 300 | .296084 | .0839612 | .0214135 | .608538 |
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zscore | mp_i1 | mp_i2 | cr | fxi | inf | sm | inc | gro | lerner ins | |
zscore | 1.0000 | |||||||||
mp_i1 | 0.1203 | 1.0000 | ||||||||
mp_i2 | 0.1222 | 0.9993 | 1.0000 | |||||||
cr | 0.1430 | -0.2086 | -0.2082 | 1.0000 | ||||||
fxi | 0.1461 | 0.4627 | 0.4488 | 0.4813 | 1.0000 | |||||
inf | 0.1978 | 0.8018 | 0.7976 | 0.1905 | 0.7298 | 1.0000 | ||||
sm | 0.0989 | -0.1787 | -0.1552 | 0.5685 | 0.0095 | 0.0182 | 1.0000 | |||
inc | 0.0208 | -0.0653 | -0.0648 | -0.0955 | -0.1047 | -0.0958 | -0.0252 | 1.0000 | ||
gro | -0.1095 | -0.3343 | -0.3555 | 0.0328 | 0.0562 | -0.2153 | -0.4937 | 0.0116 | 1.0000 | |
lerner | 0.1612 | 0.1462 | 0.1485 | 0.5026 | 0.4026 | 0.3208 | 0.3448 | -0.1788 | -0.1120 | 1.0000 |
ins | 0.1925 | 0.4753 | 0.4744 | 0.7025 | 0.5432 | 0.6008 | 0.3699 | -0.1151 | -0.2282 | 0.5134 1.0000 |
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
Number of obs | = | 270 | |
Time variable : nam | Number of groups | = | 30 |
Number of instruments = 12 | Obs per group: min | = | 9 |
F(7, 29) = 97.10 | avg | = | 9.00 |
Prob > F = 0.000 | max | = | 9 |
Coef. | Std. Err. | t | P>|t| | [95% Conf. | Interval] | |
zscore | ||||||
L1. | .7332959 | .0349532 | 20.98 | 0.000 | .6618084 | .8047833 |
mp_i1 | -77.6337 | 24.2307 | -3.20 | 0.003 | -127.191 | -28.07635 |
lerner | -67.31281 | 15.25861 | -4.41 | 0.000 | -98.52016 | -36.10546 |
inc | -5.837649 | 5.310698 | -1.10 | 0.281 | -16.69925 | 5.023949 |
gro | -4.069882 | 49.1818 | -0.08 | 0.935 | -104.658 | 96.5182 |
inf | 17.60018 | 8.508213 | 2.07 | 0.048 | .1989317 | 35.00143 |
ins | 142.714 | 32.37464 | 4.41 | 0.000 | 76.50044 | 208.9276 |
_cons | -52.03248 | 15.46953 | -3.36 | 0.002 | -83.67123 | -20.39373 |
Warning: Uncorrected two-step standard errors are unreliable.
Instruments for first differences equation Standard
D.(inc gro L.zscore ins)
GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) L(1/9).mp_i1 collapsed
Instruments for levels equation Standard
inc gro L.zscore ins
_cons
GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.mp_i1 collapsed
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -3.76 Pr > z = 0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -0.79 Pr > z = 0.430
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 9.13 Prob > chi2 = 0.058 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 6.61 Prob > chi2 = 0.158 (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: iv(inc gro L.zscore ins)
= | 0.01 | Prob > | chi2 | = | 0.943 | |
Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3) | = | 6.61 | Prob > | chi2 | = | 0.085 |
Number of obs | = | 270 | |
Time variable : nam | Number of groups | = | 30 |
Number of instruments = 12 | Obs per group: min | = | 9 |
F(7, 29) = 97.28 | avg | = | 9.00 |
Prob > F = 0.000 | max | = | 9 |
Coef. | Std. Err. | t | P>|t| | [95% Conf. | Interval] | |
zscore | ||||||
L1. | .7330487 | .0350088 | 20.94 | 0.000 | .6614476 | .8046497 |
mp_i1ins | -136.0426 | 41.59345 | -3.27 | 0.003 | -221.1108 | -50.97448 |
lerner | -67.88617 | 15.28354 | -4.44 | 0.000 | -99.14452 | -36.62782 |
inc | -6.101499 | 5.33318 | -1.14 | 0.262 | -17.00908 | 4.806078 |
gro | .0312943 | 48.83054 | 0.00 | 0.999 | -99.83838 | 99.90096 |
inf | 18.33111 | 8.571848 | 2.14 | 0.041 | .7997111 | 35.86251 |
ins | 150.1159 | 33.00869 | 4.55 | 0.000 | 82.60551 | 217.6262 |
_cons | -56.34188 | 15.63251 | -3.60 | 0.001 | -88.31396 | -24.3698 |
Warning: Uncorrected two-step standard errors are unreliable.
Instruments for first differences equation Standard
D.(inc gro L.zscore ins)
GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) L(1/9).mp_i1 collapsed
Instruments for levels equation Standard
inc gro L.zscore ins
_cons
GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.mp_i1 collapsed
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -3.76 Pr > z = 0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -0.80 Pr > z = 0.426
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 9.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.061 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 6.28 Prob > chi2 = 0.179 (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: iv(inc gro L.zscore ins)
= | 0.01 Prob > | chi2 | = | 0.930 | |
Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3) | = | 6.27 Prob > | chi2 | = | 0.099 |