fighting movements of the militia and guerrillas and the people. The main force of the Inter-Zone and the local army of the province were deployed on important intersections and key locations, ready to open fire as soon as the enemy appeared. The agencies of the Provincial Party Committee switched to secret operations, hiding documents and reducing the size of the agency. At the same time, the Provincial Party Committee instructed the District Party Committees and Party cells to establish secret units to be able to operate legally when the enemy invaded.
After the conference, the Provincial Military Inter-branch Party Committee immediately held a meeting, promptly raising urgent requirements on ideological leadership for the troops; on military operation policies; and combat plans when situations arise. The Provincial Military Inter-branch Party Committee directed the district militia military party cells to step up the work of motivating the troops and guerrillas, promoting the pioneering spirit of each party member in the situation where the enemy attacked the locality and proactively coordinated well with the forces to destroy the enemy's forces and their means of war. In addition, the Provincial Military Inter-branch Party Committee also pointed out weaknesses that needed to be overcome immediately, which were:
“Although the armed forces are on the way to maturity, the training work is still heavily formalized in the form and scale according to the regular method. Many places where militia and guerrillas are trained have separated the guerrilla warfare motto from the actual terrain and topography of the locality. That is also why the trend of local troops and militia and guerrillas is to stimulate concentrated combat rather than dispersed activities and base building.
Political education work in building armed and paramilitary forces is also heavily focused on peacetime, not fully preparing the brothers to have a high fighting spirit. Education on relations between armed and paramilitary forces is not thorough, so there is a phenomenon of local troops looking down on the militia and guerrillas, paying little attention to guiding, helping or coordinating combat.
The organization of the military intelligence network to grasp the enemy was still weak, so many good opportunities to destroy the enemy were missed.
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While the enemy was preparing to attack Thai Binh, according to the request from above, some units of the province were tempered and tested in combat, and most of them were supplemented by the main force and local guerrillas and militia were recruited to replace them; so by the end of 1949, the province's armed forces had weak technical and tactical capabilities as well as general combat experience..."[9, p.80].
To overcome the above limitations, in January 1950, party committees at all levels led the provincial and district armed forces and the militia and guerrillas to focus highly on military training, ideological education, and readiness to fight the enemy.
Chapter 1 Summary
Thai Binh is a place with flat terrain, surrounded by rivers and seas on all sides. The province has many important waterways and roads, the villages are relatively concentrated, and there are many solid bamboo fences.
The vast majority of Thai Binh people's lives are closely linked to the fields and are heavily oppressed by the ruling class, so they have a deep hatred for the enemy and absolutely trust in the leadership of the Party and President Ho Chi Minh. The Party's base in Thai Binh has existed since 1930. Through many struggles and challenges, the people of Thai Binh have been trained to have a level of enlightenment, a heroic spirit, to endure hardships, and to defeat the enemy.
Thai Binh is a large rice granary of the Red River Delta, with a large population, a warehouse of people and treasure, so when the enemy returned to invade the delta, Thai Binh became an important position in carrying out the enemy's plot of "using war to feed war, using Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese". The Party Committee of Thai Binh province, implementing the Central's directive, soon organized and mobilized the people in the province to carry out a comprehensive, all-people resistance war. Thai Binh became a place of fierce struggle between us and the enemy, both a battlefield to fight the enemy and a place to exploit human and material resources to serve the resistance war.
CHAPTER 2
THE PARTY LEADERSHIP STRENGTHENED THE GUERRILLA WAR, STEP BY STEP DEFEATING ALL ENEMY PLOTS, TACTICS OF Sweeping, TERROR, AND PACIFICATION, AND LIBERATING THE HOMELAND (February 1950 – July 1954)
2.1. The Party launched a guerrilla war to defeat all enemy plots, terror, and pacification (February 1950 - 1951)
2.1.1 The Party launched a guerrilla war right after the French colonialists invaded Thai Binh (February 1950)
As the rear base of Inter-Zone Three, Thai Binh has an important strategic position in terms of geography, military, economy and society. Located in the triangle of Hanoi, Hai Phong, Nam Dinh, Thai Binh is a province in the main battlefield of the North. In occupying Thai Binh, the French colonialists aimed to: seize human and material resources from us, consolidate their rear security, and create favorable conditions in dealing with our people's resistance on the main battlefield of the North.
To carry out this plot, on October 16, 1949, the enemy launched the Antoracite campaign to capture Phat Diem and Nam Dinh. On December 22, 1949, they launched the Diabolo campaign to capture the free zones of the two provinces of Hai Duong and Hung Yen. On January 21, 1950, after capturing Hung Yen and Hai Duong, controlling the Luoc River, the enemy occupied the right bank of the Red River, from Vu Dien to Ly Nhan (Ha Nam), forcing Thai Binh into a situation of being surrounded on all four sides.
Faced with the above situation, on February 3, 1950, the Standing Committee of the Inter-Zone III Party Committee issued a directive "on destroying the enemy's plot to occupy the plains". The directive clearly stated: After consolidating the Hai Duong and Hung Yen fronts, the enemy can attack widely to Thai Binh and the right bank of the Red River to sweep and destroy our bases". [60, p. 190]. The Inter-Zone Party Committee required localities to "generally
"mobilizing human resources, material resources, and financial resources to serve the front line", "fighting against excessive optimism and panic pessimism", "preparing plans for automatic and self-sufficiency in all aspects when communication is broken", "firmly grasping and developing the commune guerrillas, fighting against sweeps, strongly developing continuous resistance", "urgently building more main forces", "fighting against the enemy's plot to loot and destroy..."[60, p. 190]. However, fighting against the enemy's plot to occupy the plains is still considered a task in the preparation for a general counter-offensive.
To protect the last free zone of the Left Bank, the Inter-Zone Committee mobilized the 64th Regiment to Thai Binh “with the mission of blocking each small enemy attack, fighting against sweeps, guiding and developing local armed forces”[60, p.190]. But this mobilization was carried out slowly. By the time the enemy attacked Thai Binh, the main fighting force in the province consisted only of Battalions 505 and 124 of Regiment 42 and four local companies that had just been built in the province, with weapons lacking, and many landmines and mines that had not been used for a long time were damaged[60, p.191].
At the end of December 1949, the Thai Binh Provincial Party Committee held an expanded meeting to discuss and approve a number of measures to proactively respond when the enemy attacked. The conference advocated establishing a resistance command committee in each region in the South and North of Route 10 to prevent communication breakdown when war broke out; coordinating the forces of Regiment 42 and local militia and guerilla units of the province and district to guard important traffic routes, places where the enemy could land, blocking the way to prevent them from advancing deep into the interior. The provincial Party Committee agencies had to switch to secret operations; the district Party Committees and branch Party Committees established secret units to stay and operate when the enemy occupied. The conference also criticized the ideological manifestations that "Thai Binh is not a battlefield", and ambiguity in assessing the enemy...
Preparations for dealing with the enemy have been thoroughly communicated to all levels and sectors, but the atmosphere of "preparing for a general counterattack" is very exciting, and the awareness of some cadres, party members and people is still distorted. Many opinions say that "it has been four years
Now the enemy does not dare to attack and occupy Thai Binh, let alone now, our balance of forces is shifting strongly to a general counterattack, the enemy is concentrating its forces to deal with it" [60, p.191]. At this time, Thai Binh was the rear of Ta Ngan. The provincial military command, the civil, political, and party agencies of the five provinces were all concentrated here, the bustling activities made the people even more subjective. The combat preparations in some places were still sketchy, subjective, and lacked vigilance, partly because we were still immature (building rafts to block enemy ships on the Red River and Luoc River; "shaping spikes and planting them all over the fields, to guard against French attacks and parachuting"). The Inter-Zone III Committee commented:
“The subjective belief that the enemy did not have enough troops to occupy Thai Binh land led to inadequate preparations, resulting in passive response and many more difficulties.”
On February 8, 1950, just two days after capturing Vinh Bao, the French colonialists mobilized over 5,000 elite troops, mostly Euro-African soldiers, directly commanded by Colonel Gang Do, departing from Nam Dinh, Ha Nam, Hung Yen, Hai Duong, Kien An, and massively attacked Thai Binh. With the support of 2 warships, 4 canoes, 18 amphibious vehicles along with artillery and air force, the French army divided into many branches and quickly penetrated deeply and divided Thai Binh into two parts, North and South, along Highway 10.
From the right bank of the Red River, more than 1,000 enemy soldiers led by a major crossed the Red River and landed in Tan De, My Loc, Gia Loc (Thu Tri). From there, the enemy divided into three groups along Route 10,220,223 to capture Thai Binh town. A group of their troops continued to cross the Tra Ly River to capture Cat Dam Church, An Le crossroads.
From Hai Duong and Hung Yen, the enemy attacked Thai Binh in three directions. The first group, about 1,500 men from Hung Yen town, crossed the Luoc River to attack Hung Nhan and Duyen Ha to block our reinforcement route from the Right Bank. The second group, about 1,000 men from Hao Khe (Hai Duong) crossed the Luoc River to Hiep wharf, followed Highway 217, attacked Quynh Coi district town, then advanced to Highway 217.
10 occupied the Do junction. The third force, with a force of more than 1,000 soldiers, crossed the Luoc River from Ninh Giang, advanced to occupy Phu Duc district, then advanced to Highway 10, coordinated with a wing from Vinh Bao (Kien An) to attack and occupy Nghin bridge. From there, they followed Highway 10 to join forces at the Do junction and then attacked the surrounding areas. The enemy's attacks were all intercepted by district troops and commune guerrillas, causing them losses.
At the sea and the mouths of the Hoa and Tra Ly rivers, enemy warships and canoes patrolled, surrounded and threatened our armed forces.
Through many massive attacks, on the afternoon of February 8, 1950, the French army occupied Thai Binh town, occupying key positions on Highway 10 and northern districts such as Do (Dong Quan), Duc Linh (Phu Duc), Ben Hiep (Quynh Coi), Ha Xa, Doan Ban, Do Dao (Hung Nhan), Thuong Ho (Thu Tri)...
On February 10, 1950, the enemy attacked from Thai Binh town to An Le crossroads. Tran Quoc Tuan Company (main force of the province) ambushed at Sa Cat bridge and killed more than 30 people. When they reached the middle of Truc Noi and Dong Nam roads, the enemy was ambushed by Battalion 124 (belonging to Regiment 42) and killed more than 20 people. The enemy's attack along Tra Ly river to Dong Lan was also hit by a mine, killing 7 people on the spot. When they rushed into the hamlet, they were killed by grenades thrown by guerrillas and killed 5 people.
After two days of enemy attacks, on February 10, 1950, the Standing Committee of Thai Binh Provincial Party Committee convened an extraordinary conference with the Command of Front 5, representatives of sectors, sectors, and districts to discuss measures to lead the people to fight the enemy. The conference determined that the enemy attacked Thai Binh to expand the occupied area, plunder human resources, material resources, and destroy the resistance base.
Regarding combat forces, the Conference discussed preparations to welcome Regiment 64 into Thai Binh for combat. Regiment 42 deployed Battalion 505 to the south of Thai Binh; Battalion 124 was stationed in the north of the province, proactively organizing battles against enemy attacks. District army units and commune guerrillas fought in villages, developed guerrilla tactics, and depleted the enemy's strength. The four major
The provincial team fought the enemy while developing local guerrilla warfare, maintaining contact with the Inter-zone and the Central. The conference advocated stepping up political education and ideological leadership, organizing armed propaganda teams deep into Catholic areas to mobilize and establish political bases; organizing a network to prevent espionage, prevent reactionary activities, develop enemy agitation work, simplify agencies, add people to combat units, disperse warehouses, and hide assets.
The extraordinary Provincial Party Committee Conference (February 10, 1950) was of great significance. The conference not only set out the guidelines for combat operations but also proposed action plans that were close to the actual situation. The trust of the Party, the people and the armed forces was consolidated, the base was maintained, creating favorable conditions for the locality to enter the resistance war.
To reduce difficulties for Thai Binh, in mid-February 1950, Front 5 also instructed the Left Bank provinces and the main army units of the Inter-zone to organize coordinated activities with the Thai Binh battlefield.
After stabilizing their positions and controlling important traffic routes, from February 16, 1950, the enemy concentrated their forces to attack and occupy the districts north of Highway 10. Although they were faced with overwhelming enemy forces and supported by artillery and aircraft, under the leadership of Party committees at all levels, the army and people of the districts north of Highway 10 fought 64 battles at most of the enemy's attack points, of which 4 battles against the sweeps by the army and people of Phu La, Hau Trung, Nguyen Xa, and Khanh Lai were very fierce.
At Phu La (Tien Hung) from 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on February 11, 1950, Quang Trung Company coordinated with Quynh Coi platoon and local guerrillas based on the village to fight fiercely against many attacks by an enemy battalion, killing and injuring dozens of them. At 2:00 p.m. the same day, enemy planes came to bomb and fire for nearly 30 minutes, we retreated to preserve our forces.
In Hau Trung on February 14, 1950, a district army platoon and two commune guerrilla platoons, equipped mostly with mines, daggers, grenades, and machetes, fought back the enemy's surprise attack for 6 hours, killing more than a dozen of them. It was not until noon that the enemy entered the village.
At Nguyen Xa on February 17, 1950, the village guerrillas used grenades, mines, knives, swords... to fight off the attack of 400 enemies with strong firepower. After six attacks, each more fierce than the last, the enemy still could not enter the village and had to retreat, some of them were killed and injured.
In Khanh Lai (Tien Hung) on February 18, 1950, a unit of De Tham Company, Company 24 (Battalion 505, Regiment 42) and local guerrillas deployed forces to fight against an attack by over 100 enemies. The battle was fierce from morning to noon, the enemy had to abandon the sweep, taking with them more than a dozen dead and wounded.
Due to the resistance of our army and people, it was not until February 28, 1950 that the enemy basically captured the northern districts of Thai Binh. They occupied important traffic routes, occupied key positions in the town, along Highway 10, Highway 39, the Red River and Luoc River dykes; armed Catholic reactionaries, built forts, and established militia to fight against the resistance.
In the fight against the enemy's invasion, the army and people of the districts north of Route 10 fought back steadfastly. However, we could not break the enemy's attacks, and in many places we could not hold our villages. In places where the enemy attacked, resistance bases were destroyed, and cadres, party members, and guerrillas were driven from the ground. In some places, the people feared enemy terror and did not dare to let the army and guerrillas enter the villages.
After 21 days of attacking and occupying 4 districts in the north of Thai Binh province, the enemy regularly maintained a force of nearly 5,000 troops, establishing a system of 39 posts in important areas such as: towns, districts in the north of the province and traffic routes. Then on February 29, 1950, they sent another 2,000 troops from Hai Duong and Hung Yen to strengthen