Binh Dinh Provincial Party Committee led the guerrilla warfare movement from 1965 to 1975

Therefore, the guerrilla force of Binh Dinh also decreased. According to the Resolution on Guerrilla Warfare in June 1969, after the Tet Offensive in 1968, 579 guerrillas were added to the provincial and district troops, so the guerrilla force decreased from 6,650 comrades to 5,500 comrades. By June 1969, the whole province had 7,939 guerrillas of all kinds. Of which, there were 268 commune teams, 309 village teams, 1,433 commune guerrillas,

2,020 village guerrillas, 908 secret guerrillas, 3,001 youth guerrillas. Of each type, there were 1,914 women, in addition, there were 3,699 militiamen, 46 special forces teams, 32 engineer teams. In the southern districts, the number of commune guerrillas decreased compared to before, while the number of secret guerrillas increased.

According to this Resolution on Guerrilla Warfare, the guerrilla forces in the province are unevenly distributed. In the North of the province, the guerrillas are more concentrated. According to statistics, Hoai Nhon is the district with the largest guerrilla force in the province with 1,192 guerrillas (Hoai Chau commune has up to 557 guerrillas). Next is Phu My district with 1,446 guerrillas of all kinds (My Duc commune has 180 guerrillas). However, there are districts with only 7 commune team cadres, 7 commune guerrillas, and 85 secret guerrillas.

At the Provincial Party Committee meeting in May 1969, the Provincial Party Committee really called for the need to further strengthen the guerrilla force, build a people's war posture, and have the entire people serve guerrilla warfare.

The Party Committee has emphasized on improving the quality of the guerrilla force since the early years of the resistance war against the US. In the current period, in addition to continuing to open training courses to improve the skills of the guerrilla force and increase the proportion of party members and union members for the guerrillas, the Provincial Party Committee also mentioned the task of strengthening the direct leadership of Party committees at all levels in perfecting the guerrilla apparatus, and at the same time, promoting political and ideological education for the guerrillas.

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The Party Committee also paid attention to ensuring material resources including food, provisions and weapons for the guerrillas. Faced with difficulties in transporting food, ammunition and medicine, the Party Committee advocated exploiting the

on-site logistics, that is, relying on the people. At the same time, encourage the development of homemade weapons to equip guerrillas.

In addition to strengthening the quality and quantity of the militia and guerrilla forces, the concentrated army forces of the province and district were also given attention for development. According to the 1968 Military Report of Binh Dinh Provincial Military Command, before the Mau Than Tet in 1968, the concentrated force of the province consisted of 16 units with 1,284 people, which increased to 1,774 people by the end of November 1968. The local army of the district also increased from 865 people to

1,186 people. These troops are regularly trained, educated, and professionally developed. Specifically, there are 14 training courses for cadres and professionals, in addition, the provincial military command also organizes many training courses for combat cadres. On average, in 1968, the provincial concentrated units studied for 2 months, the district troops studied for 1.5 months, the specialized troops studied for 40 days, and the special forces, reconnaissance, and information support units studied more.

Through training courses, it has contributed significantly to improving the quality of the armed forces in the province in general and the militia and guerrilla forces in the province in particular.

In 1969, the enemy began to implement the strategy of “Vietnamization of the war”. They accelerated the plan of “pacifying the countryside”, destroying the bases of the guerrilla warfare movement while the revolutionary side had not yet shifted its focus of activities to the countryside, thus the armed forces in Binh Dinh were seriously reduced. Even

1,520 new recruits (533 new recruits from the North) were added to the provincial and district troops, so the concentrated force of the province at the end of 1969 had 1,509 people, the district force had 966 people, and the district team cadres had only 33 comrades. The targets on the number of guerrillas set by the Provincial Party Committee in 1969 did not achieve the expected results. By the end of 1969, Binh Dinh had 4,148 guerrillas, accounting for 2.6% of the population in the plains and 12.7% of the population in the mountains. With this number, 1969 was the year Binh Dinh had the fewest number of guerrillas during the entire period of resistance against the US to save the country. Although the number

Although the number of guerrillas decreased, the highlight of the guerrilla force in Binh Dinh this year was that the proportion of female guerrillas, party members, and union members in the guerrillas increased compared to before, reaching the highest rate from 1965 to 1975. The proportion of female guerrillas reached 30.7%, the proportion of party members in the guerrillas reached 13%, and the proportion of union members in the guerrillas reached 25.8%. In each district, specialized teams were organized, such as commando teams, engineer teams, anti-aircraft teams, and homemade weapons production teams.

Guerrilla training continued to receive attention. Training courses for cadres of commune and district military forces, special forces, secret guerrillas and self-defense forces were regularly organized. Guerrillas were also given more attention in providing weapons. By the end of 1969, provincial guerrillas were equipped with 1,550 guns of various types, an average of 1 gun for every 4 guerrillas. In addition to guns, guerrillas were also provided with a number of explosives such as grenades, mines, explosives, etc.

Implementing the May 1969 Resolution of the Provincial Party Committee on developing the quality and quantity of guerrilla warfare. In 1970, although the provincial revolutionary movement encountered many difficulties due to the brutal tactics of the US and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in their "rural pacification" plans, the armed forces in the province continued to increase. At the end of June 1970, the Provincial Party Committee Standing Committee and the Provincial Military Command decided to increase the number of troops according to the principle of strengthening training for soldiers and guerrillas capable of destroying the enemy's apparatus of suppressing the people and destroying the local army. Implementing this policy, the province's concentrated units were strongly built. In addition, each district also built 2 to 3 companies with 1 reconnaissance platoon and 1 commando company of 12 to 14 comrades, well trained and equipped, capable of destroying enemy platoon-sized outposts. [45; [p174] By the end of 1970, the total number of concentrated troops was 2,895, of which 724 were from the district troops. The guerrilla and self-defense forces had 4,304 people, of which 526 were party members, accounting for 12%, 777 were union members, accounting for 17%, the percentage of female guerrillas was 18%, and the percentage of child guerrillas was 9%. The guerrillas had established 17 teams and 11 elite groups. These elite groups

concentrated in the northern districts of the province such as Hoai Nhon, Phu My and Phu Cat.

These results of the guerrilla warfare movement were the basis for the Guerrilla Warfare Conference in November 1970 to set out the direction, tasks, and specific targets of this movement in the coming time.

Developing the number of local troops and guerrillas is one of the top concerns in the preparation for guerrilla warfare. Accordingly, implementing the Resolution of the Provincial Party Committee Conference and the Resolution of the Guerrilla War Conference, in 1971 and 1972, the militia continued to increase. In 1971, there were 5,475 people, this number increased to 5,996 people in 1972.

The preparation of food, provisions, weapons and ammunition was always considered important. From November 1971, the Provincial Party Committee Standing Committee and the 3rd Division Command launched a "rice campaign". To ensure that the 1972 strategic attack would take place smoothly, preparations for the campaign were urgently deployed. The people contributed 31,000,000 VND, purchased 7,500 tons of food and 250 tons of salt, and mobilized 600,000 working days to serve the battlefield. By mid-March 1972, the rice reserves in the North of the province were enough for the 3rd Division and the Provincial Military Command to operate until June 1972. Weapons and medicinal herbs stored in the campaign warehouse were 102 tons, etc. The Provincial Party Committee mobilized the masses to fence 1.6 million meters of combat village fences, dig 2.1 million meters of trenches, 131,000 shelters, 735 artillery shelters,

15,000 livestock protection tunnels, 1,560 fortifications and 2,300 combat positions were built.

The elaborate and comprehensive preparation in all aspects to serve the war was a necessary condition for the Binh Dinh Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Military Command to carry out the goal of promoting the guerrilla warfare movement to win the people's support and defeat the US strategy of "Vietnamization of the war" in Binh Dinh.

If from the beginning of the war, we considered the people as the root of all problems, liberating the people and bringing benefits to the masses was the goal and motivation for the Vietnamese people to rise up and fight the US, then for the US and its henchmen, the key point

In all their war strategies, they also aim to win people over. Many “pacification” programs with different names were implemented throughout their war strategies. In “Vietnamization of the war”, “rural pacification” was considered by the US as the “key” that determined the victory of this strategy.

In Binh Dinh, the Provincial Party Committee also soon identified the task of "destroying the enemy and winning the people" as the central task of the entire Party, the entire army, and the entire people of Binh Dinh. This was also the basic task throughout the guerrilla warfare movement in the province from 1969 to 1973. However, in each period, depending on the specific conditions, the Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Military Command led the guerrilla warfare movement to carry out specific tasks aimed at the goal of winning and keeping the people.

In 1969 (up to November 1969), the army and people of Binh Dinh carried out 4 major campaigns of Military Region 5. In addition, the province also launched 2 rounds of operations in July and October. The total number of days in the campaign was 235 days. During the 235 days of war, the armed and paramilitary forces in the province fought 1,672 battles (including 780 raids, 141 ambushes, 82 artillery attacks, 64 counter-ambushes, 264 sweeps, 146 mine attacks, 30 explosives, 97 snipers, 11 traffic attacks, 55 disguised attacks, 12 aircraft attacks). Eliminated 21,735 enemies from the battle. The guerrillas alone organized 871 battles including: 366 raids, 59 ambushes, 1 artillery attack, 21 counter-ambushes, 165 sweeps, 116 mine and grenade attacks, 2 explosives attacks, 93 target shootings, 40 disguises, 8 aircraft shootings. Eliminated 5,496 enemies from combat. Captured 202 guns of various types with 24,500 bullets, 133 grenades, 8 mines, burned 2 fuel depots with 6.1 million liters of gasoline, burned 100 military vehicles, shot down 39 aircraft. [120; p. 10] The most typical in destroying the enemy in 1969 was the combat achievement of the provincial special forces soldiers. With a small force, in 1969, the special forces organized 365 large and small battles, eliminating 7,750 enemies, capturing 115 guns, destroying 92 warehouses, burning 110.2 million liters of gasoline with many facilities.

Other enemy material. Damaged 140 military vehicles, 1 ship, collapsed 2 bridges, 141 houses, 12 power plants, 96 bunkers, liberated 1 prison in Phu Cat with 20 people. Right from the first days of the Spring campaign, soldiers of the special forces organized attacks on many locations in and around Quy Nhon town such as Quy Nhon airport, zone I, Deo Son warehouse area, Mieu Lo, Phu Hoa, etc. Along with that was a series of raids and ambushes by Battalions 50 and 52 on the areas surrounding Phuoc Long commune headquarters, Dieu Tri station (Tuy Phuoc), Phu Dao bridge (Nhon Khanh) destroying many facilities, killing many enemies.

Guerrilla warfare has also made an important contribution to maintaining and developing the strategic offensive, especially in major campaigns. In many places, guerrillas have promoted the combat capability of the most legitimate force, especially guerrillas in Phu Cat, An Nhon and Quy Nhon town. Most of the guerrilla districts have coordinated with provincial and district troops to attack and destroy the enemy with high efficiency.

In Hoai Nhon, guerrillas coordinated with the district armed forces to attack the enemy in Bong Son, Tam Quan, and raided the De Duc base. Notably, the Tam Quan Nam commune guerrillas organized raids to destroy the enemy many times. For example, on March 20, 1969, Tam Quan Nam guerrillas raided and destroyed a republican platoon in Chom Chua (Cuu Loi Dong). Then, on June 14, guerrillas here organized an ambush for the enemy in Chom Cat (Tang Long village). On July 22, they ambushed and destroyed an enemy company. Together with Tam Quan Nam guerrillas, guerrillas from Hoai Thanh, Hoai Chau, Hoai Hao communes, etc. organized raids against the enemy many times, destroying many enemy "pacification" groups.

Hoai An district guerrillas coordinated with district troops to organize deep attacks and destroy enemy forces in Go Cam, The Thanh, Long My, An Thanh, and Thanh Tu.

In Phu My, right from the Spring campaign, the guerrillas closely coordinated with the district army to organize attacks and destroy the enemy many times. A typical example was the attack in Trung Tuong hamlet (My Chanh). In May, guerrillas in almost all communes in the district were active in destroying the enemy. A typical example was the My Hiep commune guerrillas who ambushed and destroyed 1

evil group. Binh Thuan guerrillas ambushed and destroyed a platoon of security soldiers. Binh Quang, My Trinh, and My Thang guerrillas continuously rose up to fight the enemy's sweep.

The guerrillas in Phu Cat coordinated with the district army to organize many raids and ambushes to kill South Korean soldiers and villains. On April 15, the guerrillas of Cat Nhon commune ambushed the Dai An road and killed 9 South Korean soldiers. Then, on May 16, the guerrillas and Company 1 of Phu Cat district raided and completely killed a militia platoon in Thai Phu village. Along with military activities, the district's secret guerrillas carried out the destruction of villains and supported the masses in breaking up the siege. Typically, the secret guerrillas of Cat Hanh commune disguised themselves in the Hoa Hoi concentration area and killed the secret agent Pham Ngoc Quy, then broke into Nui Mot lake and killed 2 American soldiers. On September 23, two female secret guerrillas, Dinh and Long, broke into Tan Dan market and used grenades to kill 28 security soldiers and "pacification" troops.

In Tuy Phuoc, guerrilla activities were active throughout 1969. Starting on April 10, 1969, 7 Phuoc Son guerrillas attacked and severely damaged a "pacification" group, killing 10 enemies. After the mourning week for Uncle Ho, Tuy Phuoc guerrillas continued to rise up with local troops to continuously attack the enemy. On September 11, guerrillas attacked the American technical staff area in Ngoc Chau, destroying 4 houses and killing many American soldiers. On the same day, guerrillas attacked Long Van (Phuoc Long) to destroy the "pacification" villains. After the raid by Phuoc Hau guerrillas and Battalion 405 on the Phu Hoa fuel depot, burning tens of millions of liters of gasoline, in October, Phuoc Hau guerrillas ambushed Thi Nai lagoon and sank 5 enemy patrol boats. On the night of November 4, they attacked Suoi Tien. On December 14, they attacked the logistics area of South Korean soldiers. December 17 attack the enemy in Phu Tai.

In the plain districts, guerrillas actively organized to destroy the enemy and destroy the enemy, while in the mountainous districts such as An Lao and Vinh Thanh, guerrillas actively organized to fight against sweeps, fight commandos, shoot down enemy planes, build combat villages, and protect liberated areas.

Besides the military struggle, the armed forces in the province also achieved

Many achievements were made in mobilizing the masses to destroy the enemy's grip and win the people. In 1969, in many places such as My Hiep, Cat Hanh, Nhon My, Binh An, An Tin, Phuoc Hung, people were brought back to their old villages. Many other communes and villages in Phu Cat, Hoai An, Tuy Phuoc, An Nhon, Binh Khe, Phu My districts raised the people to the level of mastery and loosened the grip. We completely destroyed 10 strategic hamlets, damaged 19 other hamlets out of a total of 29 hamlets built by the enemy in the whole province. 8 concentration areas were also completely destroyed by guerrillas and people.

13,000 bandits were killed, a 60% increase in the number of bandits killed compared to before.

The political struggle movement was maintained and improved in quality, especially in direct struggles in the countryside and the plains. There were 2,250 struggles mobilizing 580,000 people to fight against rapid pacification, against elections for village councils, to break the shackles, to gain mastery, and to demand a return to the old village. In urban areas, the masses participated in hanging flags and distributing leaflets. On Buddha's birthday, nearly 50,000 people in and out of the city organized a struggle against Thieu Ky in a public and legal form, forcing the enemy to mobilize thousands of police, republican soldiers, and South Korean soldiers to pacify them. Most of the struggles to build production dams were victorious. In some places, the masses even violently fought the enemy. For example, the people in My Thang, My An, My Tho, My Duc, and Binh Giang used bare hands, sticks, hoes, and shovels to fight against enemy tanks. The people of Cat Hanh chased the South Koreans away.

The work of enemy agitation continued to develop, many mutinies broke out successfully. In 1969, 3,953 enemies of all types deserted (including American soldiers and mercenaries). Four civil defense platoons, two militia platoons, three youth combat platoons, one commando platoon, and two rural pacification groups collectively deserted. In Hoai Nhon, Phu My responded internally 6 times, killing 99 enemies, wounding 19 others, severely depleting a republican company, burning down two ammunition warehouses, destroying one jeep, and capturing 27 guns.

The work of building combat villages and communes continued to receive attention. In 1969, the militia and guerrillas supported the people in digging 1,857 spike pits and 3,921 crossbows.

Binh Dinh Provincial Party Committee led the guerrilla warfare movement from 1965 to 1975 - 11

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