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Practical Activities of the Council and Committees


Fourth, the National Assembly and the Committees are still "outside" of the National Assembly's questioning activities.

Evaluating the National Assembly's supervisory tools, in the work " Vietnam's National Assembly in the Rule of Law State", the authors stated that questioning seems to be the most effective tool of National Assembly supervision in Vietnam [9, p.397]. However, contrary to this observation, the current questioning activities at the National Assembly sessions and at the meetings of the National Assembly Standing Committee only recognize the role and responsibility of individual deputies, the role of the subject exercising the right to question of the National Assembly deputies, but have not recognized the role of the subject and authority of the National Assembly Council and the Committees in this activity. The supervisory tool of questioning is only held in the hands of National Assembly deputies, not yet given to the Council and Committees. Meanwhile, a reality recorded in the activities of the National Assembly is that the number of questions from National Assembly deputies at recent sessions is generally relatively large, while the time for questioning and answering questions in the Hall is not long, mainly a few days, therefore, the nature of direct, in-depth dialogue and debate on the questioning issue is limited, making it difficult to ensure quality (please refer to Appendix 4 for more information).

In the context of the activities of positions elected and approved by the National Assembly taking place regularly, continuously and having a great influence on social life, the agency responsible for supervising the activities of these agencies, the National Assembly of our country, operates irregularly. Using "irregularly" to supervise "regularly" is clearly difficult to meet practical requirements and ensure effectiveness. The National Assembly's granting of the right to question to National Assembly deputies is also partly aimed at overcoming this limitation. However, the majority of National Assembly deputies in our country are non-professional representatives, and their time must be spent mainly on daily work, so it is difficult to regularly monitor and question positions elected or approved by the National Assembly, so the effectiveness of this delegation of authority is somewhat limited. This reality has also been pointed out in a number of recent research works, such as Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pham Duy Nghia commented, “Questioning others is a difficult task, and it is even more difficult when the person being questioned is powerful, knowledgeable, well-informed, and has a professional apparatus to assist. At the present time, it can be predicted that the National Assembly must prepare more capacity to be able to question the responsibilities of our country's executive agencies” [54, p.16]. Meanwhile, if we consider the capacity of the subject, compared to the subject conducting the questioning, which is the current National Assembly Deputies, the National Assembly Council and the Committees have a very basic advantage as regular operating agencies of the National Assembly, and their grasp of the situation and information about the areas under their responsibility is certainly more complete and comprehensive than that of individual deputies. In terms of personnel, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly Council and the Committees overwhelmingly operate under the regime of


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In terms of expertise, members of the Council and Committees are generally specialized and have a deep understanding of the areas of operation of the Council and Committees. If any issues arise that require questioning at any time, these agencies will be able to conduct the questioning immediately, promptly responding to practical requirements [80]. The fact that the Council and Committees do not get involved in a hot area of ​​operation that requires expertise and needs to be discussed and debated thoroughly, which is revealing major "loopholes" due to the fact that the "burden" is only placed on the shoulders of individual National Assembly deputies, is not really reasonable and is not beneficial to the common interest.

The ability to link the roles and responsibilities of the National Assembly's Councils and Committees in the questioning activities of the National Assembly has become a content raised from the practical activities of the National Assembly [104], [65, p.33]; as well as from a scientific perspective in a number of recent research works [80]. However, in reality, in-depth research and proposals for specific contents on the contents related to establishing questioning authority, order, implementation procedures... questioning of the Council, Committees or organizing questioning at these agencies are generally still open. In addition, in the process of promulgating the Law on National Assembly 2014, some opinions of National Assembly deputies also proposed to study and supplement regulations on the right to question of National Assembly deputies at the National Assembly's Councils and Committees [16], but the Law on National Assembly 2014 also did not stipulate this content.

Practical Activities of the Council and Committees

Fifth, regarding the monitoring reports of the People's Council and the Committees, compared to the inspection activities, the Law on Social Insurance of People's Armed Forces 2008 (now the Law on Social Insurance of People's Armed Forces 2015) has relatively specific regulations on the inspection reports of the People's Council and the Committees. Meanwhile, up to now, similar regulations on the monitoring reports of the Council and the Committees have not been issued. This partly shows the "lameness" in the legal framework on the activities of the People's Council and the Committees. In 2004, the Regulations on the activities of the People's Council and the Committees of the National Assembly (Article 36) only briefly stated: the monitoring results and recommendations of the People's Council and the Committees are reported to the Standing Committee of the National Assembly and the National Assembly in the form of a monitoring results report; the monitoring results report must fully reflect the opinions of the members of the Council and the Committees; thus, the content of this regulation is too sketchy. The Law on the National Assembly and People's Councils promulgated in 2015 also does not have any regulations on this content.

3.2.3. Practical recommendations of the People's Council and Committees

3.2.3.1. Results achieved

Firstly, the National Assembly and its Committees have made many practical recommendations on national and people's livelihood issues, which have been accepted by relevant agencies, have solutions, and have brought about great practical effects. The following results can be mentioned:


important achievements that the Council and the Committee have achieved in this activity, for example, from the practice of supervision, the Council of Ethnic Minorities has recognized the fact that although our State's investment in mountainous areas and ethnic minority areas has many programs, it is still scattered and not focused on the most difficult areas, so the efficiency is not high; therefore, the Council of Ethnic Minorities has recommended to the Prime Minister that there should be a socio-economic development program for Region III, which is a particularly difficult area. After the Council of Ethnic Minorities made a recommendation, this recommendation was accepted by the Government, the Prime Minister issued Decision No. 135/QD-TTg dated July 31, 1998 on socio-economic development of particularly difficult communes, mountainous areas and remote areas (referred to as Program 135). The results showed that this Program is suitable for reality, has great political and socio-economic significance, and creates important momentum for hunger eradication and poverty reduction in our country [81, p.141].

Second , in perfecting laws and policies related to the fields under the Council and Committee's responsibility, many recommendations of the Council and Committee through thematic supervision activities have been accepted and overcome; approved by the National Assembly. For example, the recommendations of the Standing Committee on shortcomings in the legal status and organization of the civil judgment enforcement agency system; policies to improve the effectiveness of civil judgment enforcement; overcoming shortcomings in the prison and reform regime, rationally organizing prisons; expanding people's rights in administrative complaints, overcoming difficulties in implementing the Land Law, the Law on Complaints and Denunciations; shortcomings in implementing the Penal Code on Gambling and the execution of the death penalty [102, p.719], etc.

3.2.3.2. Existing problems and limitations

Firstly, many recommendations have not received timely responses and have not been thoroughly implemented. This is an observable reality in the monitoring activities in recent years. For example, as the experience of the 12th National Assembly Inspection Committee mentioned when summarizing its term, "the current concern is that reasonable recommendations through monitoring activities are rarely considered and thoroughly resolved by competent agencies" [100, p.139]; on the side of the Committee for Science, Technology and Environment, "many pressing issues on science, technology and environment of localities that the monitoring delegation recommended have not been resolved or satisfactorily answered. This has existed for many years in the monitoring activities of the National Assembly" [104]; etc. One of the reasons for this situation, according to the UBPL, is due to the regulations on the responsibilities of the subjects subject to monitoring in


The implementation of post-monitoring recommendations is unclear [96, p.6]. On a more specific level, Dr. Bui Ngoc Thanh believes that many post-monitoring recommendations are still general, and the subject of supervision also finds it difficult to implement; on the other hand, the "sanctions" after supervision are only monitoring, urging and continuing to make recommendations, so they do not have a motivating effect [70].

It can be said that the limitations in the recommendation activities of the Committees, especially the issue of the mechanism to ensure the responsibility of the subject under supervision in implementing the recommendations, if there is no early solution, may continue to cause negative consequences for the common interest. For example, as delegate Le Thi Nga demonstrated at the meeting on October 30, 2014, the 8th session of the 13th National Assembly, in the past (1999, 2003), aiming at managing and using ODA loans more closely and effectively, the Committee had 2 supervisions; until the PMU18 incident occurred in 2006, this Committee continued to report on the supervision recommendations of the previous time to correct the violations, but these recommendations have not been fully accepted [4, p.5]. This is noteworthy and unusual in the operations of some public agencies, in the context of difficulties in state budget revenue and expenditure, improving the efficiency of management and use of ODA is extremely urgent, especially in the current situation of public debt and loss. It is noteworthy that cases like the above example are not exceptions. For example, as reflected by the Central Committee before the Standing Committee of the National Assembly regarding the monitoring of documents: "The Central Committee has proposed amendments many times, but the handling is very slow, affecting the rights and legitimate interests of citizens (for example, Resolution No. 01/2006/NQ-HDTP dated May 12, 2006 of the Council of Judges of the Supreme People's Court guiding the trial of the crime of gambling)" [102, p.445]. However, it must also be seen that legally, the recommendations of the Council and the Committee do not have mandatory value for implementation, but only lead to the responsibility of the relevant entities to respond. Therefore, for the common good, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council's implementation of the right to make recommendations, the Committee cannot ignore this feature and needs to emphasize more on the proactive role in implementing more drastic measures to promote specific responses and reactions, that is, there is a change in practical activities towards the Council's and Committee's recommendations.

Second , in the practical implementation of the Committees' right to make recommendations, there is still a situation where the recommendations that have been made have not been followed up to the end. The Council's self-assessment results and the Committee also frankly acknowledged this situation. For example, according to the Council's assessment of its activities during the term, "subjectively, there is a lack of perseverance in urging agencies to respond to issues that need to be questioned, some


The monitoring period is still general, there are no specific findings to make specific recommendations, and some opinions are still inappropriate" [63, p.209]. Avoid the possibility of a situation that, as National Assembly Deputy Tran Ngoc Vinh [119] stated, is "beating the drum and abandoning the stick" in reality, and this is also considered the weakest link in monitoring activities to date.

Third, the measures that the Council and the Commission can use to ensure changes in the implementation of their recommendation authority have not been clearly defined. In a recent study, the authors argued that current laws are lacking and do not provide for simple, easy-to-use sanctions that can have a great impact on changing the perception and actions of the subjects subject to supervision, such as criticism and public announcement to the press [82, p.75]. To reasonably use the power of the publicity factor and avoid arbitrariness, it must first become a legal tool that the Council and the Commission can use, but this has not been stipulated by law.

Fourth, the order and procedures for implementing the right to propose a vote of confidence by the National Assembly and the Committees are still lacking and incomplete and need to take into account the new relevant provisions of the 2013 Constitution. According to the provisions of Article 34 of the Law on the National Assembly Supervisory Council 2003 (Article 45 of the Law on the National Assembly and People's Council Supervisory Council 2015), Article 33 of the Regulations on the operation of the National Assembly Supervisory Council and the Committees of the National Assembly, during the supervision process, if it is discovered that a person holding a position elected or approved by the National Assembly has committed an act of violating the law or has not properly and fully performed the assigned tasks and powers, causing serious damage to the interests of the State, the legitimate rights and interests of organizations and individuals, or when there is a written recommendation from at least 20% of the total number of members of the National Assembly Supervisory Council and Committee members on considering a vote of confidence for a person holding a position elected or approved by the National Assembly , the National Assembly Supervisory Council and the Committees have the right to propose the National Assembly Standing Committee to consider submitting it to the National Assembly for approval . vote of confidence for that person. In case the majority of Council and Committee members (from 2/3 of the total number of Council and Committee members or more) vote in favor, the Council and Committee shall then propose to the Standing Committee of the National Assembly to consider submitting to the National Assembly for decision on the vote of confidence. In fact, up to now, there has not been any case where the Council and Committee have exercised this authority.

Some people think that this regulation is too strict and therefore difficult to implement in practice. According to NCS, similar to the laws of many other countries, the proposal for a vote of confidence is related to the stability of the Government, other agencies in the state apparatus in particular and the political system in general, so it is an objective requirement to be very careful and strict about the process. However, in terms of positive law, the strict factor


The strictness is not really guaranteed, because Article 33 of the Regulations on the operation of the National Assembly's Council and Committees stipulates that there must be written recommendations from at least 20% of the total number of members of the Council and Committees, but there are still many unclear points in this content. For example, the written recommendations of at least 20% of the total number of members here are individual written recommendations of each individual member of the Council and Committee or recommendations in a common document? Because if the recommendations are in a common document, how can 20% of the members of the Council and Committee be gathered? Is it acceptable to mobilize and persuade members of the Council and Committees to participate in the recommendation activities? Voting at the Council and Committee has been regulated by secret ballot (Article 45 of the Law on Supervisory Councils of the National Assembly and People's Councils 2015), but should the form of the document be a report, recommendation, conclusion, or should it be a resolution of the Council and Committee? The content of opinions disagreeing with the proposal for a vote of confidence, even if they are in the minority, is reflected in the recommendation of the Council and Committee submitted to the Standing Committee of the National Assembly or not... Thus, these are gaps that can lead to the consequence that the implementation can be arbitrary and inconsistent, while the recommendation for a vote of confidence is an important matter and cannot be implemented loosely.

In addition, regarding the subject of the National Assembly, the Committee recommends a vote of confidence according to the provisions of Article 34 of the Law on the National Assembly Supervisory Council 2003 (Article 45 of the Law on the National Assembly and People's Council Supervisory Council 2015) that "persons holding positions elected or approved by the National Assembly" is too broad; not closely linked to the field of activities of the National Assembly and the Committee. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that according to the provisions of the 2013 Constitution (Point 7, Article 70 ) , the subject of "persons holding positions elected or approved by the National Assembly" has been greatly expanded compared to the 1992 Constitution, accordingly, additional subjects have been added such as the Chairman of the National Election Council, the State Auditor General, heads of other agencies established by the National Assembly, and judges of the Supreme People's Court. If the proposal to vote of confidence for some positions such as Chairman of the National Election Council, Judge of the Supreme People's Court... can be carried out by the National Assembly and all Committees, it is also an issue that needs to be carefully considered.

3.2.4. Method of operation of the Council and Committees

3.2.4.1. Results achieved

The methods of implementing the activities of the National Assembly and the Committees have made important improvements and innovations in the direction of promoting true socialist democracy in the activities of these agencies, increasingly in line with the principles of operation, position and role of the National Assembly and the Committees. With a spirit of dedication, responsibility, openness, frankness and constructiveness, the National Assembly deputies who are members have promoted their intelligence and contributed more and more.


Actively and proactively participate in the activities of the National Assembly and the Committee, especially in plenary sessions and in participating in the activities of the National Assembly's Supervisory Delegation and the Committee. The National Assembly also assessed that, in the context of a small number of full-time delegates, a large workload, and high quality requirements, the National Assembly and the Committees have continuously researched and improved working methods, promoted collective intelligence, capacity, and strengths of each member, proactively coordinated with relevant agencies, increased seminars, and consulted with experts and scientists... [66, p.258]. With those improvements and innovations, the activities of the National Assembly and the Committees, in general, have created favorable conditions for the National Assembly and the Standing Committee of the National Assembly to consider and decide on matters under their authority.

3.2.4.2. Existing problems and limitations

a) On the operating principle

Firstly, democratic centralism has not been clearly defined in the law as a principle in the operation of the People's Council and the Committees.

As presented in Chapter 2 of the thesis, in principle, Article 3 of the current Law on National Assembly Regulations stipulates that the National Assembly operates in a conference regime and makes decisions by majority. Regarding the National Assembly Standing Committee and Committees, Articles 66 and 68 of the 2014 Law on National Assembly Regulations stipulate that the National Assembly Standing Committee and Committees are agencies of the National Assembly, operating in a collective regime and making decisions by majority. In terms of law, if based on this provision of the Law on National Assembly Standing Committees, it may lead to the understanding that the National Assembly Standing Committee and Committees only implement the principle of working in a collective regime and making decisions by majority as prescribed in Article 68. However, some other relevant legal documents, such as the 2008 Law on Public Security and Legal Aid (Article 45), stipulate: "The examination report must fully reflect the opinions of the members of the agency in charge of the examination" (Article 67 of the 2015 Law on Public Security and Legal Aid has similar provisions); Article 36 of the Regulations on the operation of the National Assembly's Council and Committees also stipulates: "The report on supervision results must fully reflect the opinions of the members of the Council and Committees". According to the 2013 Constitution (Article 8), democratic centralism is a principle implemented in the organization and operation of our State apparatus.

Thus, based on these regulations, it can be concluded that democratic centralism is being operated as one of the principles in the activities of the Council and the Committee and has been tested in practice. However, instead of reasoning, clearly defining this principle in the activities of the Council and the Committee is a practical requirement, because not clearly defining democratic centralism as a principle in the activities of the Council and the Committees can lead to inconsistent perception and implementation in practice.


Second, the principles of collective work and majority decision making are not fully guaranteed.

It can be said that the actual operation of the principle of collective work and majority decision of the National Assembly and the Committees is not always smooth. The regular nature of the activities of the National Assembly and the Committees is currently mainly carried out through the activities of the Standing Committee. Through recent National Assembly terms, the practical activities of the National Assembly and the Committees show that the lack of full participation of members in plenary sessions is still an issue that has not been completely resolved.

For example, since the 11th tenure, the reality of the Law Committee shows that because most of the Committee members work locally and hold part-time jobs, the time for the Committee's activities is limited [94, p.158]. By the 12th tenure of the National Assembly, this reality has remained almost unchanged, "some Committee members hold part-time jobs, holding important positions in state agencies, so they cannot regularly participate in plenary sessions to review draft laws and ordinances..." [96, p.4]; "because most of the Committee members hold part-time jobs, the Law Committee cannot regularly organize plenary sessions of the Committee" [97, p.362]. The reflection of the UBTP also shows that: "many review meetings of the entire Committee often lack many members, some sessions have up to 1/3 of the total number of members absent, which affects the discussion, debate and especially ensuring the principle of collective work and majority decision" [102, p.717]. Even for the UBPL - the Committee assigned the task of ensuring the constitutionality, legality and consistency of the legal system, when organizing meetings of the Committee, the number of participating members is not always sufficient and this reality has affected the implementation of the principle of collective work and majority decision in the activities of the Committee [97, p.362]. During the term of the 13th National Assembly, the opinion of a National Assembly deputy at the meeting on November 22, 2013, the 6th session of the 13th National Assembly also reflected this reality:

“ On the National Assembly side, we are mainly part-time delegates. The National Assembly Committees, including the Economic Committee, never have the entire Committee fully examine them. At best, we can only get a few people to vote. Sometimes, even without a majority, we have to ask for opinions, so how can we have quality?” [116].

This may simply reflect the reality of organizing plenary sessions of the Committee at a certain time during the current term of the 13th National Assembly; but it also continues to show that this is a reality that cannot be easily overcome if we continue to maintain the current multi-layered operation regime of Council and Committee members.

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