Route 9 Khe Sanh Campaign Spring Summer 1968

Our forces were far away. Due to the imbalance of forces and heavy casualties, Battalion 8 organized a retreat. We destroyed 180 enemies, shot down 1 plane and captured some weapons, but could not finish them off. In that situation, the commander of Regiment 102 ordered Battalion 7 to urgently prepare to attack to finish off Lang Cat stronghold. On the night of May 30, our troops attacked Lang Cat stronghold for the second time. The battle lasted until the morning of May 31 but we still could not achieve complete victory, the enemy still kept the transportation route open.

Discovering that the 308th Division was present in Khe Sanh, the US Military Assistance Command (MACV) was very worried, believing that we would try to destroy the main combat base of Ta Con. The enemy hastily mobilized troops right on the Route 91 battlefield to organize an operation to Khe Sanh aimed at the 308th Division's area of operation. This enemy operation was codenamed Operation " Scotland 2 " 2 and was commanded by the Command of the 3rd US Marine Division 3 .

On June 1, 1968, the enemy sent reconnaissance aircraft to operate in the airspace of Route 9 and south of Khe Sanh to detect our forces and prepare landing sites. On June 2, 3, and 4, the enemy used helicopters to land 2 battalions of marines and 1 artillery battalion to occupy the bases of Ta Ri and Ta Quan; a third battalion of marines landed in Pa Trang and Huc Cot Giang, from there spreading out to capture a number of other footholds.

Based on the nature of the enemy's operations and the way they landed troops, the Route 9 - Khe Sanh Campaign Command determined that the enemy launched this operation to deal with our increasing encirclement of Ta Con. Besides, it was also necessary to guard against the enemy sending troops this time to stretch our forces and then withdraw from Khe Sanh . The Campaign Command decided to concentrate its forces to destroy the enemy's airborne troops, ordering the Division

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1 Including: 4th Regiment (missing 1 battalion) and 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, US Marines.

2 Operation Scotland 1 was organized by the 3rd US Marine Division to sweep the Quang Tri area in November 1967.

3 This was the first American division to openly participate in combat in South Vietnam (March 1965), established in 1942, including Regiments 3, 4, 9 and reinforced by Regiment 26 of US Marines, with a total strength of over 15,000 people.

Division 308 had to postpone the plan to attack Lang Cat for the third time to concentrate its forces to attack the enemy troops landing by air in the area south of Khe Sanh. Strictly following the order, on the night of June 3, Division 308 ordered Battalion 7, reinforced by a part of Battalion 8, to carry out an operation to attack the enemy in Pa Trang. At exactly 4:00 a.m., our troops opened fire to attack the Pa Trang stronghold. The enemy was completely surprised, but because their firepower was very strong, and they continued to send reinforcements, we organized a retreat. This was a battle with high combat efficiency, we killed 110 enemies, captured many weapons and suffered 9 casualties [41, p. 206]. Faced with the situation of the enemy increasing their troops to occupy Pa Trang, we were determined to concentrate our forces to completely destroy the enemy troops here. The 308th Division ordered the 9th Battalion (now in the Cat Village area) and the 5th Battalion of the 88th Regiment (which was preparing to attack the high point) to

241) and a special forces unit of the Division carried out a quick march to the Pa Trang area. On the night of June 5, 1968, our troops opened fire and attacked Pa Trang for the second time. Because they had anticipated our intention to concentrate our forces to finish off Pa Trang, before we opened fire, the enemy had sent helicopters to pick up a large part of our forces, and the remaining units moved their positions. By the morning of June 6, we discovered the remaining enemy units at the bottom of the hill, so we opened fire and attacked, killing 70 of them. However, because our forces were thin, the enemy still resisted fiercely, forcing us to retreat. At noon on June 6, the enemy sent helicopters to pick up the remaining troops from Pa Trang.

Despite our fierce attacks, the enemy continued to organize landings. On June 6, the enemy continued to land 3 American companies along with 4 105mm artillery pieces at Hill 635 (Dong Em). On June 7, the enemy continued to land troops at K'lung. On June 8, when our troops withdrew, the enemy landed troops again at Pa Trang; at the same time, they landed 3 companies at Huc Thuong. The enemy believed that with these landings, they would be able to deal with the 308th Division, push our forces away from the area around Route 9 and reduce pressure on

Ta Con combat base. Following the order of the Campaign Command, the 308th Division ordered its units to take turns attacking the enemy continuously at high points as soon as the enemy landed troops. On June 8, we attacked the enemy at Huc Thuong. On the night of June 9 and early morning of June 10, we attacked the enemy at Dong Em, destroying a large part of the enemy force. The enemy increased the use of artillery and bombers around the landing points; at the same time, continued to land troops at these high points to reinforce. Despite many difficulties and losses, our units still continuously attacked the enemy day and night, not giving them time to rest. Under constant pressure from our troops, in mid-June 1968, the enemy used helicopters to pick up troops at these high points to Ta Con. Immediately after that, the enemy landed troops in the west and south of Ta Con. That action of the enemy was not beyond the previous campaign command's prediction: " The enemy could jump deeper to the south, southwest of Khe Sanh, blocking the supply logistics lines, causing difficulties for us in the front " [41, p. 206].

In mid-June 1968, the General Command sent the 246th Independent Infantry Regiment to replace the 304th Division. The 304th Division withdrew to the rear for consolidation. Thus, from mid-June, in Khe Sanh, we only had the 246th Regiment fighting the enemy in the west of Ta Con, and the 308th Division (missing 1 regiment) fighting the enemy in the south of Ta Con. Our army continuously organized attacks on the enemy at the high points where the enemy had just landed troops. Typically, in the 2 attacks on the enemy at Pu Nhoi (high point 690) on June 16 and June 18, we destroyed more than 400 enemies (mainly Americans), shot down 3 helicopters, and captured many enemy weapons. On June 19, the enemy sent 2 battalions of marines from the Khe Sanh area to reinforce Dong Ha and Cua Viet, which were being strongly threatened by us, and brought troops back to defend Route 9 and the south of Ta Con. Operation Scotland 2 ended here.

During this operation, units of the 308th Division destroyed

1,380 soldiers shot down and burned 11 planes of various types, destroyed 7 artillery pieces and mortars; heavily damaged the 3rd Battalion, 4th Regiment of the US Marines.

In the west, the 246th Regiment continued to surround and control heights 832, 845 and 689, destroying a part of the enemy's forces.

From June 20, the enemy force in Khe Sanh had only 5 battalions of marines. Consecutively on June 21, 22, and 23, the enemy sent 3 battalions of marines to sweep and search 2km southwest of Ca Lu to protect the safety of the road transport route and the air supply corridor for Khe Sanh; at the same time, the enemy withdrew troops from some outlying bases to Ta Con, moving some equipment and heavy weapons out of Ta Con.

Realizing that the enemy was likely to withdraw from Khe Sanh, the Campaign Command ordered its units to closely monitor the situation, be on guard against enemy withdrawals, and resolutely attack the enemy as soon as they began to withdraw their troops and during the entire process of retreat. Following orders from their superiors, Regiment 246 organized a tight siege of high points 832, 845 and 689, restraining and preventing the enemy from evacuating troops by helicopter. Another unit of Regiment 246 coordinated closely with Regiment 88 of Division 308 to attack the enemy at Ku Boc, high point 471 and Lang Khoai (on Route 9).

On June 26, 1968, the enemy announced their withdrawal from Khe Sanh . However, due to our fierce attacks, the enemy's retreat had to be prolonged. It was not until July 7, 1968 that they withdrew all their forces from Ta Con base. On the morning of July 8, 1968, we entered and took control of Ta Con base.

By July 15, 1968, the enemy withdrew all troops from Khe Sanh to concentrate in the Ca Lu - Tan Lam area. The Route 9 - Khe Sanh campaign ended here.

As a result of the enemy's retreat, we killed 1,333 Americans; shot down or burned 34 planes of various types; destroyed 5 trucks, 5 artillery pieces and mortars.

In the 4th phase, we killed 5,100 enemies; shot down or burned 96 planes; destroyed 31 artillery pieces, mortars and 46 vehicles.

Chapter 3‌

RESULTS, MEANING AND SOME EXPERIENCES

3.1. Overall campaign results

After 177 days and nights of fighting1 , our army and people destroyed and captured 11,900 enemies (mainly Americans); shot down and destroyed 197 aircraft of all types; sank and hit 80 warships and transport ships, large and small; destroyed 78 vehicles of all types (including 8 tanks), 46 artillery pieces, mortars [7, p. 52] 2 and many other means of war3 .

In this campaign, we attracted and detained a large force of enemy elite troops to directly fight on Route 9 and the force was ready to provide reinforcements. At its peak, this battlefield attracted up to 40% of the total mobile forces of the US army present on the battlefield in South Vietnam [78, p. 170] 4 .

We destroyed the enemy's defense system on Route 9 from Ca Lu to the Vietnam - Laos border, completely liberating Huong Hoa district with over 100,000 people.

10,000 people, contributing to firmly protecting the Truong Son road - our North-South strategic supply route.

On our side, because the war took place in extremely fierce conditions, many units had to fight continuously for long days, and the number of troops was not regularly replenished, so in order to create the victory on Route 9 - Khe Sanh, we also had

1 This was the longest campaign of the Vietnam People's Army up to 1968. If we count the entire 30 years of the war for national liberation and defense of the Fatherland (1945 - 1975), the Route 9 - Khe Sanh campaign had the 4th longest duration after the Nguyen Hue campaign (April 1, 1972 to January 19, 1973), the Quang Tri defense campaign (June 28, 1972 to January 31, 1973), and the Toan Thang campaign (October 25, 1969 to April 25, 1970).

2 Currently, there are many different figures given about the losses of both sides in this campaign.

3 According to statistics by American historian Prados, in the Khe Sanh area alone, the number of American soldiers killed was

1,000 people, 4,500 people were wounded and he concluded that " this was a campaign that America had to pay a very high price in blood " [79, p. 516].

4 General Van Tien Dung said that at the peak of the campaign, the Route 9 front had trapped half of the US forces (17/33 brigades) [22, p.200].

great losses: thousands of soldiers were sacrificed, 1 , 4,394 officers and soldiers were seriously injured [69, p. 64]. American authorities reported to President Johnson that: The Communists had suffered about 10,000 - 15,000 casualties [73, p. 259].

* Successes and limitations of the Route 9 - Khe Sanh campaign

In general, in the Route 9 - Khe Sanh Spring - Summer 1968 campaign, we analyzed correctly, grasped the situation, correctly judged the enemy's plots and actions, on that basis made the right determination; flexibly implemented tactical forms (ambush, raid...); closely directed tactics to destroy many enemy forces. Officers and soldiers on the entire front always raised their determination to fight, endured many sacrifices and hardships but were still determined to stick to fighting the enemy. However, in this campaign, we were not able to pull a large enemy force to Route 9 early as required before the opening fire of the General Offensive and Uprising in the entire South, were not able to destroy many enemy forces, and were not able to completely destroy an American battalion in any battle (the initial plan was to destroy 20,000 - 30,000 enemies, including completely destroying 5 - 7 American battalions and 2 - 3 puppet battalions). This limitation was due to many reasons. Objectively , our army's main combat target was the elite American army, which was supported by a large amount of firepower; on the other hand, the enemy had high mobility (mainly by aircraft) and often

constantly moving positions so we are difficult to detect and approach. Subjectively , we cannot concentrate our forces on the main direction 2 , the main target; during the fighting, many units were ordered to move to fight in other battlefields so we do not have a strong enough mobile force to completely defeat the enemy battalions that responded to the rescue; some officers and commanders of the units participating in the battle

1 In 1968, 3,994 of our soldiers died on the Route 9 battlefield (Source: Department of Operations, No. 124/Tgi, file 1103, February 14, 1969 ). It can be said that the majority of these officers and soldiers died in the Route 9 - Khe Sanh campaign.

2In fact, we have identified the West as the main direction (that is, the direction that requires a higher number of combatants), and the East as the important direction. However, from the beginning, we have arranged our forces in both directions equally.

The fight was not resolute in concentrating forces to defeat 1 ... However, those limitations cannot cover up or obscure the extremely great victory of this historic campaign, as General Hoang Van Thai said: " We must attach the effect of the Route 9 - Khe Sanh campaign to the overall strategic attack on the urban areas - the enemy's inner nerve center - with the attack of our main force on the outer ring on the pre-selected mountainous battlefield (Route 9 - Khe Sanh, Central Highlands, Southeast) to fully see the significance of its victory " [7, p. 75].

3.2. Historical significance

The victory of the Route 9 - Khe Sanh Campaign had a very great historical significance, not only in the 1968 Tet Offensive and Uprising, but also in the resistance war against the US to save the country in general.

First of all, it was a strategic feint for the attack of our army and people on almost all cities in the South. Going back in time, in the last months of 1967, when discovering the movement of our troops around Khe Sanh base, General Westmolen predicted a major attack by the Viet Cong there. In mid-December 1967, US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent General Wheeler - Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to South Vietnam to grasp the actual situation on the battlefield. During the meeting with General Wheeler on December 15, 1967, Westmolen affirmed: " The main goal of the Communists is to capture Khe Sanh, turning Khe Sanh into a second Dien Bien Phu " [35, p. 21]. Therefore, he ordered the consolidation of this military base. And he even wanted to fight a decisive battle with the Communists at Khe Sanh, a battle

1 For example, Regiment 9 of Division 304 was tasked with besieging Ta Con, instead of organizing more forces to threaten the enemy, it automatically withdrew 2 battalions to the rear without orders; Regiments 24 and 66 missed some opportunities to destroy the enemy; Regiment 102 of Division 308 was reinforced with artillery firepower and was tasked with destroying the enemy battalion at Lang Cat stronghold, but the commander of Regiment 102 did not concentrate forces to organize an attack to destroy the enemy, but only used each battalion (on the night of May 28, Battalion 8 was used, on the night of May 30, Battalion 7 was used), so both times the attack on Lang Cat stronghold was not completed, and we suffered heavy casualties...

According to Westmoreland himself, the attack was a turning point for the American war in Vietnam . Westmoreland declared that he wanted to make a " reverse Dien Bien Phu ", wanting to " drown the communist divisions under a waterfall of bombs and mortar shells " [56, p. 836].

On the night of January 20, 1968, our troops opened fire to attack Khe Sanh and the entire Route 9 defense line of the enemy. The Khe Sanh attack immediately attracted the attention of the whole United States. American journalist Michael McLaughlin described the opening attack of our troops as follows: " In the early morning of January 21, 1968, North Vietnamese long-range artillery opened the siege at Khe Sanh with disastrous precision, 300 shells killed 18 American soldiers, 40 wounded, those shells fell like falling on Washington " [41, p.148]. General Westmoreland quickly mobilized a very large force to the north of Military Region 1 - Army Corps 1 of the Republic of Vietnam - where the Khe Sanh battle was taking place. He declared that " the situation at Khe Sanh was really serious and it could be a turning point for the war in Vietnam " [79, p. 324]. Reflecting the attention of the US side to the battle of Khe Sanh at this time, journalist Neil Sheehan said " Journalists gathered where the commander-in-chief planted the flag. The whole country was watching " [56, p. 840].

Cities throughout the South were still considered peaceful. America was focusing its attention on Khe Sanh. When all the attention of the US was focused on Khe Sanh, on the night of Tet Mau Than 1968, our army and people suddenly launched an attack on almost all urban areas throughout the South, hitting the headquarters of the US and the Saigon government. The attack on the urban areas shook America. Thus, until the moment our army and people opened fire on urban areas throughout the South, the US strategic agency had made wrong judgments about our strategic attack targets .

President Johnson's memoirs state that on February 12 (that is, 10 days after our army launched an attack on almost all urban areas across the country)

Route 9 Khe Sanh Campaign Spring Summer 1968 - 9

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