Peruvian Currency. The Daily Income of Poor People in Micro Enterprises Is Around 4 – 8 Nuevos Soles. 1 Nuevos Soles Is About 7,000 VND


from Europe, 23 from Asia, 15 from sub-Saharan Africa, and 13 from Latin America). Gächtera, Herrmannb, and Thönia (2004) surveyed and tested trust and voluntary cooperation among more than 330 students and 300 non-students in rural and urban Russia. The results showed that socioeconomic factors influenced trust, but no separate effects of socioeconomic variables on cooperative behavior were found in a community contribution experiment. However, cooperation was significantly correlated with trust in strangers and beliefs about the fairness and helpfulness of others. Students were generally less trusting, contributed less to the community, and older people showed more trust than younger people.

In Karlan's (2005) experiment, the rules of the game were first explained to participants before the task was assigned. All players received 3 Nuevos soles 1 , were randomly paired, and assigned either A or B. After the pairing was announced, the participants could see their partner, but they were immediately separated so that they could not exchange with each other. Then, A gave B 0, 1, 2, or 3 of their coins. If A did not give B the money, the game ended. If A gave B money (1, 2, or 3 coins), the game master recorded it and transferred the money to B. Then, B gave A some money back and the game ended. Additionally, before the game begins, player B will disclose information about his assets before player A makes his move to ensure “fairness” because if A does not give B the coin, both will end up with the same amount of money. With the game ending quickly and without consequences after the game, the perfect equilibrium of the game shows that if B does not give money to A, A will not give money to B either.

Public Goods Game (Games that contribute to the community).


1 Peruvian currency unit. The daily income of poor people in micro-enterprises is around 4 – 8 Nuevos soles. 1 Nuevos soles is equal to about 7,000 Vietnamese Dong.


In a society, mobilizing voluntary contributions to build public or social works is a dilemma because an individual who does not volunteer can benefit from the public good created by the contributions of others. And those who volunteer to contribute must sacrifice a part of their material wealth, money or other personal benefits for the common good. To measure social capital, researchers often use trust games and community contributions to understand and study the responses of subjects from many different professions and fields in society.

Glaeser et al. (2000) measured trust and confidence with the hypothesis: “Most people can be trusted”. The sample consisted of 258 Harvard University students. Before the game, the subjects were paired and met their partners, then separated into pairs: The sender had the opportunity to send between 0 and 15 USD to his partner - the receiver. The facilitator doubled the amount and sent it to the receiver. After receiving, the second player could return the money to the first. The results showed that wealthier and better educated people transferred more money. Black people trusted less than white people (21%). Anderson, Milyo, and Mellor (2008) used the trust game to study whether religious affiliation and participation were related to cooperation and trust. By combining survey results from questionnaires, the results showed that religion was unrelated to behavior in community giving and trust experiments. Religion was not strongly associated with many other related behaviors in controlled experiments, and their behavior appeared inconsistent or not significantly related compared to nonreligious people. Eckel and Grossman (2003, 2004) conducted a number of dictator games in which subjects unilaterally chose whether to donate money to one of a list of charities. Eckel and Grossman (2003, 2004) found no significant differences in donation propensity between subjects who attended or did not regularly attend religious services, although religious subjects responded significantly more quickly when donations to charitable groups were subsidized.


Eckel and Grossman (2002) divided participants into 41 groups, each consisting of people who had participated in the same savings and loan programs. Group sizes ranged from 9 to 29 people, based on the participants' attendance at the day's microfinance meetings. The Public Goods Game was usually conducted before the Trust Game, but the results were not revealed until participants had played the Trust Game. All the rules were explained publicly, but no discussion of the games was allowed. Each participant received a coin. Each individual could then return or not return the coin to the game manager. If the manager received 80% or more of the coins, everyone received 2 coins. Group contribution rates ranged from 55.6% to 100%, with an average of 80.7%.

3.2.3. Evaluation of method selection.


There have been many diverse experimental methods proposed and developed by economists and psychologists to measure, screen, and elicit human risk preferences and social capital. From the above methods, in order to elicit risk preferences, in the author's opinion, the method of Eckel and Grossman (2002) can be the most useful when conducting research on microfinance borrowers in Vietnam for the following reasons:

This method is relatively easy to implement.

There is a loss (trade-off) in their risk-taking decisions.

These methods have been implemented by researchers on farmers in many countries. Therefore, if the topic is aimed at farmers borrowing credit from microfinance institutions in Vietnam, the possibility of success will be higher.

In addition, for the price list selection method (Holt and Laury, 2002), although this method is very useful in terms of classifying the level of risk behavior, within the scope of this topic, the author finds it difficult to give farmers

- mainly poor people with low education level - understand and calculate


probabilities of the amount of money received. This will greatly influence the choices of participants and thus the results of surveys and experiments.

As for measuring social capital, the author chose the experiment of contributing to the community (Public Goods Game) and the experiment of trust (Trust Game) based on the experiment of Camerer and Fehr (2003) to conduct.

3.2.4. How to organize and allocate participants in the experiment.


In the 3 games (or 3 games / 3 experiments) selected, the game that stimulates risk preferences (Risk Game) has a relatively normal and simple sampling method that is not affected by whether the participants interact or agree with each other or not. Because it is only a personal decision and only affects them personally. The following 2 games, the Trust Game and the Public Goods Game, will be affected by factors such as acquaintance, compromise, reciprocity... For example, for the Trust Game, they can agree that the first person will give all 80 thousand to the controller, so the amount given to the second person will be 160 thousand VND. And so in the case of reciprocity, the second person will return 130 thousand VND to the first person, which means each person will get 30 thousand equally. In the Public Goods Game, if they all agree to contribute, in the case of 10 people participating in a group, the amount of money each person will get will be 5 thousand VND x 9 = 45 thousand VND and the organizer will lose an additional 150 thousand VND. And so each participant will definitely get 175 thousand VND.

Based on the above observations, the research team will organize the following experiments: First, each participant will meet the moderator's table (3-4 tables) to collect demographic information, then divide the Risk Game area. After the Risk Game (Game 1) ends, the organizer will base on the survey form, address, personal information... to separate the participants into groups to minimize the cases where the participants are friends, relatives,


get to know each other... At the same time, only announce and guide how to play Game 2 and Game 3 after dividing the groups and starting to implement the game in separate areas and offices. Each control group consists of 3 people: A team leader, a secretary recording the results and an assistant. Because of the preparation and screening of participation and implementation methods, the results are relatively accurate as designed and calculated from the beginning.

3.2.5. Basis for determining bonus levels in the Game.


Regarding the income of the game participants, it depends on the socio-economic conditions of each region and also depends on the calculation and choice of the researcher. Nguyen et al. (2016) researched in Vietnam and chose the average income for 1 player to be about 120 thousand VND. Gächtera, Herrmannb and Thönia (2004) experimented in Russia, the average income for 1 participant was about 2-6 Euro (about 54 thousand VND - 160 thousand VND).

Table 3.2: Average income and daily expenditure per person in Vietnam.

Unit: Copper.



Nationwide

Urban

Countryside

Income

78,900

132,134

67,934

Spending

62,934

82,034

48,134

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Peruvian Currency. The Daily Income of Poor People in Micro Enterprises Is Around 4 – 8 Nuevos Soles. 1 Nuevos Soles Is About 7,000 VND

(Source: Vietnam Statistical Yearbook, 2016 and author's calculation). The amount of money players receive in each game is 100 thousand VND, 80 thousand VND and 50 thousand VND respectively. The reason the author chooses this amount is based on statistical data.

Vietnam population living standards survey and Vietnam statistical yearbook 2016

in which the average income per person per day fluctuates between 67 thousand VND - 133 thousand VND. The average price for cutting rice and carrying rice for hire per day in the West is about 150 thousand VND - 200 thousand VND, driving a Honda motorbike taxi is about 80 thousand VND - 100 thousand VND, simple labor is about 50 thousand VND - 80 thousand VND (synthesized and calculated by the author from customer interviews during the experiment). According to the survey announcement


According to a survey by the Institute of Workers and Trade Unions (Vietnam General Confederation of Labor) on July 12, 2018, the average income of a garment worker is only about 5.5 million VND/month, or only about 180,000 VND/person/day, the price of 1 kg of rice in the West is about 8,000 VND - 10,000 VND on average. Meanwhile, the income of a player in the experiment of this study is about 200,000 VND on average, with some people earning up to 400,000 VND, equivalent to about 25 kg - 50 kg of rice for an experimental session lasting about 2 hours. Such income is also relatively satisfactory and suitable for both participants and organizers. On the other hand, if the bonus is too large, the player may waste or spend too much or have negative thoughts, play "carelessly"... which will affect the final result. Therefore, the bonus amount chosen for each game is reasonable, selective and also relatively suitable for both the game participants and the organizer. Because in case the player does not give money (neutral-untrust) in Trust Game, the player is always sure to get an income of 80 thousand VND.

Thus, the amount of money spent on each game is relatively suitable for both the game participants and the organizer.

3.3. Methods and steps to perform experiments.


A random sample of 176 microfinance borrowers was selected by the author to conduct field experiments. A total of 176 people in the sample were randomly selected and distributed in the provinces of Long An, Ben Tre, Tien Giang, Vinh Long, Hau Giang and Kien Giang. A total of 6 experimental rounds were organized, with the number of participants ranging from 30 to 38 people each round. The author also consulted senior experts currently working at microfinance institutions in the study area to identify which localities have bad debts in microfinance activities. Then, the random sampling was carried out by people, microfinance employees currently working at local microfinance institutions, the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, Agribank and a few commercial banks participating in microfinance activities. Here, the author uses the concept of credit risk as debts


loans with bad debts, that is, loans of credit institutions that are overdue for 91 days or more (according to Circular 02 of the State Bank, debts from groups 3 to 5). Before conducting the experiment, the author will conduct quick interviews with participants through a questionnaire on economic, social and demographic characteristics related to the individuals and families of the experimental participants. CBTD only participates in the random sampling process and does not participate in the experiments. Experimental participants will be publicly informed that all will receive remuneration and additional income for participating in the interviews and experiments.

Experiment 1: Eliciting risk preferences.


Each participant will receive 100 thousand VND and they will choose 1 of 6 random options listed in Table 3.3. Then, the participant will be instructed to draw 1 of 2 paper tickets, in which 1 paper ticket has the word "Win" and 1 paper ticket has the word "Lose" which means the participant wins or loses. And the participant will receive the amount of money when winning or losing is also listed in the selection table. With this choice, the probability of winning or losing of the participant is 50%. Details of the information that the experimental participant receives are as shown in Table 3.3.

o When choosing scenario 1, participants will not encounter any risks or uncertainties. This means that whether they win or lose, they will not lose money and will not receive any additional money.


Table 3.3: Game options.

Unit: Copper.


Situation

Amount of money

lose when lose

Amount received

win

Choice of

participants (mark X)

Draw results

Visit (Win or Lose)

1

0

0



2

-20,000

+30,000



3

-40,000

+60,000




4

-60,000

+90,000



5

-80,000

+120,000



6

-100,000

+140,000



(Source: Author's choice).


o For risky situations when choosing from situation 2 to situation 6, if winning, the participant will receive the corresponding increase in money but if losing, the amount of money lost will also increase accordingly.

Experiment 2: Contribute to the community (Public Goods Game).


Participants were divided into groups of 10-15 people, each participant would receive 50 thousand dong. The moderator would ask them to choose to contribute or not to contribute. If the participant agreed to contribute, he would have to give the moderator 30 thousand dong, and this amount would be divided among the players in the group, each person receiving 5 thousand dong after the game ended. If the participant did not agree to contribute, the amount of money for all the participants in the game would remain unchanged.

Experiment 3: Trust in others (Trust Game).


After completing the community contribution game experiment, participants took part in a final experiment on trust in others.

Before the start, all participants will receive 80 thousand VND and draw lots to receive 01 piece of paper randomly paired with another person numbered either 1 or 2. After that, the participants will be separated to perform the game. The moderator will ask person number 1 whether they decide to give money to person number 2 or not. If person number 1 does not give money to person number 2, the game will end. If person number 1 decides to give money to person number 2, they will give it to the game moderator. The moderator will double the amount received from person number 1 and then transfer this doubled amount to person number 2. Next, the moderator

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