Khe Sanh, the remaining forces actively fought, pushing to surround Con Tien, destroying traffic and fighting small enemy counterattacks. In addition, we also used artillery to continuously bombard and threaten the bases of Cua Viet, Dong Ha and the Caron artillery camp (base 241). Despite the shortage of troops, declining health, and difficulties in supplies, the army units still persistently followed the enemy, carried out continuous and widespread attacks, slowing down their progress.
In general, during the entire period of fighting the enemy to clear traffic, we achieved certain results. Units of the 304th Division, the 8th Independent Battalion and other forces closely coordinated with the military branches to carry out many battles, some of which achieved high efficiency, destroying many enemies such as the battle of Lang Khoai (2, 3-4), the battle of high point 471 (4-4). However, the enemy had cleared the road traffic (connecting Khe Sanh with Dong Ha); we lost most of the siege positions and artillery observation posts in the south and southwest of Ta Con, making our fighting very difficult. In the face of new difficulties, especially in terms of forces, the Campaign Command was still determined to maintain operations in a number of key areas such as Rao Quan, Ku Boc, Lang Vay; maintain the supply route for the forces west of Ta Con; promote small operations on high points 832, 845 northwest of Ta Con; Organize forces to attack traffic on the Ca Lu - Rao Quan section.
* Fighting the enemy to expand the siege (from April 7 to 14, 1968)
After connecting the road from Ta Con to Dong Ha, the enemy increased their forces to organize an attack to expand the area of control to the southwest of Khe Sanh, creating a larger safe area for the main Ta Con combat base. On April 7, the enemy used the 1st Airborne Cavalry Brigade to capture the Lang Con - Huc Ha area (this was our old position located southwest of Khe Sanh).
On the same day (April 7), the 3rd Airborne Division of the Saigon army from Nhan Bieu used helicopters to land on the hills northwest of the old Lang Vay 1 (about 2 km away) and occupied high points 400, 542, and southeast 567. After that, the enemy advanced.
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The second landing phase was at Co Put (north of the old Lang Vay). Having correctly judged the enemy's intentions, we arranged an ambush to destroy the enemy here. Immediately after landing and during the first night, our artillery attacked the enemy formation. Our forces were ordered to close in and attack. The 3rd Battalion and the 6th Airborne Battalion were killed 250 times. The enemy moved their troops to avoid being attacked by our troops. However, the 3rd Battalion and the 8th Airborne Battalion were still attacked by the 5th Battalion of the 24th Regiment all day, killing many enemies. The enemy's artillery and bombers bombarded the rear of our formation to create favorable conditions for the enemy formation to move. On the night of April 8, the enemy gathered at the 400 high point. Discovering this gathering of the enemy, our troops promptly attacked and killed 320 times . On April 9, the enemy sent the 3rd and 6th Parachute Battalions of the Saigon army to land on the hills northwest and southwest of Co Put to create a springboard for the attack to retake Lang Vay. On April 10, the 6th Parachute Battalion of the Saigon army received strong support from the air force, artillery and a part of the cavalry.
The US attacked and occupied the old Lang Vay. After a fierce battle, our troops organized a retreat. Having created a new foothold, on April 11, a paratrooper battalion of the Saigon army coordinated with a US cavalry battalion to divide into 3 groups to attack the Lang Vay stronghold (new Lang Vay). Knowing the enemy's intention, the Campaign Command requested the forces holding Lang Vay to plan a battle plan in close coordination with other military forces to resolutely defeat the enemy's attacks on the Lang Vay stronghold. Our forces, with active artillery support, repelled 3 attacks by 2 enemy battalions, killing more than 200 enemies. The enemy was pushed back and gathered at Hill 500 (northwest of Lang Vay). That same night (April 11), our forces launched a raid on Hill 500, killing more enemies.
Determined to capture Lang Vay at all costs, on April 12, the enemy mobilized air force, artillery and used toxic chemicals to launch an attack.
1 In this landing, the enemy mobilized 132 helicopters to transport troops.
2 Among them was the Major Chief of Staff of the 3rd Airborne Division of the Saigon army.
The second siege of Lang Vay. The battle was extremely fierce, and at 4 p.m. that day (April 12), our troops were ordered to retreat. After capturing Lang Vay, the 1st Airborne Cavalry Brigade continued to land troops in Pa Ka, Lang Con, Lang Troai, and Bi Hien to restore the form before February 6, 1968, pushing our forces further away. From April 12 to 14, the enemy mobilized many planes to bomb the area from Ta Khong to Ban Dong to prevent our support, creating favorable conditions for the enemy to carry out the relief.
Also during this time, the 3rd US Air Cavalry Brigade moved into Ta Con to protect Ta Con, while the enemy in the Ta Con stronghold carried out a wide attack on our encirclement positions to improve their defensive position. On April 7, the enemy used bombers on the entire western and northern defensive fronts to clear the way for the 26th US Marine Regiment to begin a wide attack to the west of Ta Con. This advance was characterized by advancing in small groups, using helicopters to drop precast concrete slabs to install bunkers wherever they went, forming new defensive positions. On April 14, the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Marine Regiment stationed at Hill 845 organized an attack to the north (2 km from our position). However, this attack was fiercely blocked by our forces. Suffering heavy losses, the enemy was forced to return to Hill 845.
On the afternoon of April 14, the enemy withdrew from the new and old Lang Vay, ending the "widening the siege" phase, destroying and pushing our forces away and proceeding to replace troops.
In the East, at the same time, our army continued to actively attack the traffic, surrounded and restrained Con Tien, shelled the bases of Cua Viet, Dong Ha and the Caron fire base (on high point 241). But because we were not active in this direction, the enemy easily responded and concentrated their forces in the West. They sent the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion of Marines from Dong Ha to reinforce Khe Sanh.
* Fighting the enemy and replacing troops (April 14 to the end of April 1968)
After expanding the siege, the enemy began to withdraw from the outer bases to Ta Con base to carry out troop replacement. The enemy mobilized the 9th Regiment (less 1 battalion) of US Marines and reinforced 1 battalion of the 4th Marine Regiment along with 2 airborne cavalry battalions to replace the 26th Marine Regiment occupying the Ta Con area so that this Regiment could withdraw to the rear for reinforcement. Discovering that the enemy was withdrawing to replace troops, the Campaign Command ordered units to actively fight the enemy in the areas of Lang Khoai, Pa Ka, and south of Lang Vay to hold them back in order to continue to destroy them; maintain the supply line; and take advantage of consolidating forces to fight for a long time .
On April 14, the enemy began to replace troops. The enemy's replacement had the following characteristics: replacing the rear first, the front later (starting to organize the replacement from the northern units, then the forces in Ta Con, and finally the units that were directly fighting with us); gradually replacing each company, each battalion, continuously throughout the day on a normal scale to avoid sudden shortages of forces, avoiding our detection; replacing troops concentrated in a safe location (units anywhere gathered at Ta Con airport before withdrawing from Ta Con); the enemy mainly used air routes, a part of heavy equipment was transported by road ; while replacing troops, artillery fire and aircraft increased attacks in the rear to ensure safety for the replacement. The Campaign Command set out a new determination: to overcome all difficulties in terms of forces, quickly regroup the unit, stick with the enemy and fight, closely follow each step of the enemy's troop replacement, approach the positions the enemy was still occupying, control the airport, hold the enemy back to destroy them . The main combat areas that needed to be focused on at this time were the high points 689, 622 and the positions of Lang Khoai, Ku Boc, restore the siege of Ta Con, and at the same time, strike hard on Route 9, not allowing the enemy to transport easily.
Carrying out the above determination, our units, although lacking in numbers and in declining health, still persisted in continuously attacking the enemy. The enemy withdrew.
After being exhausted from Lang Vay, we completely destroyed an airborne cavalry company at high point 565 (south of PaKa); a part of the enemy force attacked Siam La Ha (northwest of high point 845) and attacked La Vien Ap (north of high point 832), both were repelled by our troops. Our anti-aircraft troops concentrated on firing at areas where enemy aircraft came to pick up troops to prevent the enemy from withdrawing. Our artillery continued to fire at Ta Con airport, the enemy did not dare to use large C-130 transport aircraft to carry out supplies. The 3rd Airborne Division of the Saigon army on the way of withdrawal was continuously attacked by our troops, suffering 40% of its troops and had to be sent back to Hue for reinforcement. On Route 9, the main force combined with local armed forces to increase attacks on traffic, preparing ambushes to slow down the enemy's withdrawal.
By April 19, the enemy had completed the troop replacement. It took the 26th US Marine Regiment 6 days to arrive in Quang Tri (the troop replacement began on April 15, and they only fully gathered in Quang Tri on April 20). With the newly arrived force, the enemy only left 2 battalions to protect Ta Con, while the remaining 4 battalions operated more mobilely, ready to launch search operations to destroy our forces. In the last days of April 1968, the enemy tried to launch counterattacks around Ta Con to push our forces to spread out and reduce pressure on Ta Con. On April 21, 1968, the enemy mobilized 3 US Marine battalions supported by artillery and aircraft, divided into many groups to attack Hill 662. Our troops steadfastly held their ground, waiting for the enemy to get close before opening fire. All of the enemy's attacks were defeated. We killed 250 of them, the rest fled to Ta Con. On April 23, a cavalry unit from Lang Con - Huc Ha divided into many groups and advanced towards Lang Vay. Our troops killed more than 100 of them, shot down 2 helicopters; the rest fled to Huc Ha. Also on April 23, the enemy sent a Saigon army commando company to land by helicopter in Pe Rang. Our troops conducted a surprise attack and completely destroyed this commando company. On Route 9, our troops continuously ambushed transport convoys.
enemy movements, forcing them to send two battalions of marines to spread out to guard the road.
By the end of April 1968, the enemy had finished the operation to liberate Khe Sanh. We killed 5,200 enemies (including 3,870 Americans), including 10 American companies and 1 Saigon army company; 82 aircraft of various types were shot down; 4 mortars, 4 heavy machine guns and 21 vehicles (including 5 tanks) were destroyed.
2.4. Phase 4 - Surround Ta Con, fight the fleeing enemy (from May 8 to July 15, 1968)
After changing troops to hold Khe Sanh, the enemy still encountered many difficulties: although they had pushed our forces away, they were still continuously attacked by us, and the enemy forces were depleted; our artillery continued to fire at Ta Con airport, making it very difficult to supply the large number of enemy troops in Khe Sanh. Meanwhile, after many days of fighting, our troops were in poor health and suffered many casualties; our forces fighting in Khe Sanh at this time were relatively thin: the infantry force only had the 8th Independent Battalion fighting the enemy in Ca Lu - Rao Quan; the 66th Regiment of the 304th Division fighting the enemy in the west and northwest of Ta Con; the 9th Regiment of the 304th Division fighting the enemy in the south of Ta Con 1. Entering May, the entire South continued to launch the second phase of the general offensive and uprising. In order to coordinate more closely with the entire battlefield, the Route 9 - Khe Sanh Campaign Command proposed the policy of actively attacking and destroying a part of the enemy's forces, quickly restoring the encirclement of Ta.
The storm threatened the enemy even more, forcing them to send troops to relieve the situation a second time, attracting more enemy forces to Highway 9 to coordinate with Thua Thien.
- Hue or force the enemy to withdraw from Khe Sanh so we can destroy them outside the fortifications . The general direction proposed is: small operations, complete destruction; continuous but focused attacks; maintaining the initiative, fighting and consolidating to switch to large-scale attacks when the opportunity arises .
To strengthen the Khe Sanh front, on March 10, 1968, the General Command decided to send the 308th Division to fight in the Tri-Thien battlefield, Hue. In early May 1968, the units of the Division gathered on the west bank of the Se Pon River, 15-20km from the Khe Sanh front (lacking the 36th Regiment 2 ) with the order " to be ready with friendly units to attack the US troops in Khe Sanh ".
On May 9, comrade Do Trinh, on behalf of the Party Committee and the Campaign Command, assigned the following tasks to Division 308: " Division 308 must cut off Route 9 from Rao Quan to Ku Boc, push Khe Sanh back into a state of land isolation, forcing the enemy to come out to relieve it, creating an opportunity for us to destroy a part of the enemy's forces outside the fortifications; threaten the enemy in Ta Con, forcing them to withdraw their forces elsewhere to reinforce Ta Con, hold back as many enemies as possible, and coordinate with the second wave of attacks and uprisings throughout the region. The main policy is to fight the enemy outside the fortifications, combining small and medium attacks, creating conditions for large-scale attacks " [41, p. 198].
While the 308th Division was preparing to organize and grasp the enemy, conduct field reconnaissance, develop combat plans, learn from experience... the units present at the Khe Sanh front before that were still persistently overcoming difficulties to fight the enemy.
Thanks to timely direction, close monitoring of the enemy situation and the development of a correct combat plan, in the early days of May 1968, our troops fought many battles with quite high efficiency. On May 4, after discovering the enemy clustered at Hill 552, we launched a surprise attack, destroying most of the 3 American companies (including 2 airborne cavalry companies and 1 marine company), destroying 4 105mm and 9 106.7mm artillery pieces. In the north and northwest of Ta Con, our troops organized a siege and controlled the Heights 832 and 689. In the southeast, our troops laid siege to the enemy troops stationed at Lang Khoai, forcing the enemy to retreat.
The 24th Regiment was now ordered to retreat to the rear for reinforcement.
The 36th Regiment was ordered to stay in Ha Tinh as the Ministry's reserve force.
had to organize counterattack forces. We killed nearly 200 enemies and shot down 3 helicopters. On Route 9, on May 14 and 15, we fought a number of raids in the area south of Lang Khoai, killing 310 enemies and destroying a number of transport vehicles. On May 19, a unit of the 304th Division ambushed a base on the outskirts of Ta Con, completely destroying 1 company and 3 enemy tanks as they searched to the west. Discovering our forces, the enemy used two battalions of marines to attack southwest of Dong Che Rieng to probe and push our forces away. However, after 3 days, the enemy withdrew to defend at Ta Con.
In early May, our army's siege of Ta Con was restored, we continuously fired at Ta Con, causing the enemy much damage. The enemy no longer organized many search operations as before but brought troops back to the Ta Con posts and high points to defend, increasing the use of artillery and bombers on our positions. Faced with the enemy's entrenchment in the base, the General Command requested the Route 9 - Khe Sanh Campaign Command to increase small and medium attacks, attack by all means to draw the enemy out.
out to destroy, closely coordinating with the battlefield of the whole region . The Campaign Command chose Lang Cat 1 as the "trigger" point to cut off road supplies, forcing the enemy to clear. The 102nd Infantry Regiment of the 308th Division was assigned the task of destroying the enemy and occupying Lang Cat high point. After 2 days of preparation, at 3:12 a.m. on May 28, Battalion 8, Regiment 102, led by Battalion
Commander Pham Duy Tan commanded and opened fire to attack Lang Cat. The battle was extremely fierce. The enemy used flares to fire in all directions where our troops were attacking, enemy artillery from Ku Boc, Lang Khoai, and Ta Con bases fired fiercely to support the local forces to repel our attack. Our troops occupied a number of positions, destroying a part of the enemy forces. At dawn on May 28, the enemy urgently dispatched 2 American companies from Ta Con base, supported by aircraft and artillery, to advance to Lang Cat, intending to push back the enemy forces there.
1 Lang Cat High Point is located south of Route 9, 1km south of Rao Quan Bridge, guarded by an American company to protect convoys transporting supplies to Ta Con.