Leaders Struggle After the Geneva Accords, Change of Direction

"The mass mobilization work this year is a necessary step towards practical land reform" [68, p.129].

After a short period of thoroughly implementing the policy of the Fourth Conference of the Central Executive Committee of the Party to the Southern localities, it was discovered that if the policy of freely mobilizing the masses and abolishing land ownership by landlords were immediately applied, it could be detrimental to the resistance movement and negatively affect the policy of national unity. The Central Office for Southern Vietnam promptly issued a Directive to temporarily suspend mass mobilization. The Central Office assigned the Agricultural Mobilization Committee of the Central Office for Southern Vietnam to organize a general re-investigation of the land situation, to understand the aspirations of the classes and strata in the Southern countryside, and to make careful preparations before mobilizing the masses [147]. From the results of the investigation of the actual situation in the South, the Central Office for Southern Vietnam determined that the South did not yet have the conditions to mobilize the masses. On February 5, 1954, the Central Office for Southern Vietnam issued a Directive on implementing the Party's policy of "directly mobilizing the masses" in the South, stating: "The South, as well as the whole country, must definitely mobilize the masses to implement the Party's land policy, but the current situation on the Southern battlefield is not yet favorable for mobilizing" [69, p.467]. With a high sense of responsibility before the Party and the people, the Central Office for Southern Vietnam directed: "Anywhere that has launched or is about to launch, must resolutely stop immediately and take full responsibility before the Party" [69, p.469]. The Central Office advocated: The Party's land policy implemented in the South is mainly to reduce rent; for land without owners, in guerrilla base areas, it is not declared to be temporarily handed over, but the slogan " whoever plows, enjoys " is implemented and agricultural tax is paid.

The policy of implementing land policy must be closely linked to strengthening the great national unity bloc, closely linked to perfecting the organization of the Farmers' Association of the Central Bureau, which has given rise to many innovations in localities. Gia Dinh Ninh province established an apparatus specializing in temporary land allocation. My Tho province has the initiative to hold the Farmers' Association Sub-group.

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Guerrilla zones, assigned the responsibility of investigating land and people within the sub-group, submitted to the Provisional Council for approval, then had the responsibility of directly managing each household. Thu Bien Province had the initiative to investigate and allocate small plots in the guerrilla zone near the temporarily occupied area, ensuring both time and safety in the conditions of frequent enemy attacks. In the Western Inter-Zone, the Party Committees resolutely confiscated land from reactionary landlords and French landlords and distributed it to farmers who lacked land or had no land; assigned farmers to continue cultivating the land that had no owners, and at the same time relied on the spirit of solidarity of the farmers, mobilizing "landlords to enlighten and donate land".

The results achieved from the implementation of the correct land policy not only benefited the farmers in the South, but also ensured the strengthening of the great national unity bloc. By 1954, the South had basically implemented the 25% rent reduction policy. Regarding land, the South temporarily granted and assigned 564,547 hectares to 527,163 working peasant families. In addition, farmers also used a significant amount of land from traitors, absentee landlords and reclaimed land. At the end of the resistance war against the French invasion, farmers in the South had mastered

150,000 hectares of land, equal to half of the total land area of the region [215].

The implementation of the policy of rent reduction and temporary land allocation and allocation encouraged farmers to enthusiastically participate in production, actively contribute food, encourage their children to join the army, and develop the army to defeat the invaders. The lives of farmers in the South were significantly improved.

During the time of directing the army and people of the South to implement the policy of coordinating with the main battlefield, the Central Office for Southern Vietnam increased coordination and assistance to the resistance movement of the Cambodian people.

The Central Office of Southern Vietnam led the Cambodian Party Executive Committee and armed forces in Cambodia to step up coordinated military activities in the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring campaign, contributing to the destruction of enemy forces, liberating many temporarily occupied areas and building them into guerrilla zones.

Cambodian liberation army destroyed Vocun-Sai, forced the withdrawal of Seam-pang, and connected the base.

Northeast Cambodia with Lower Laos and Central Highlands of Vietnam.

Especially since March 1954, implementing the policy of stepping up military activities in coordination with Dien Bien Phu, under the leadership of the Central Office for Southern Vietnam and the direct direction of the Party organization in Cambodia, Vietnamese volunteer troops together with Cambodian soldiers and people fought many battles of attrition, annihilating enemy forces and destroying many of their weapons and means of war.

Also during this time, the Central Bureau promptly directed the resolution of a number of issues arising in the relationship between the Vietnamese and Cambodian revolutionaries in the southwestern border area. The reason was that local cadres were weak in economic management and lacked political acumen, so they did not handle them promptly, leading to mistakes in resolving the remaining disagreements regarding the exchange and trade of goods between a part of the Vietnamese and Khmer residents along the two sides of the border. The enemy took advantage of these manifestations, incited division, and incited some Khmer people on the neighboring land to kill Vietnamese people.

Realizing that if this situation were to continue, it would be detrimental to our people's strategic offensive and our negotiations in Geneva, the Central Office for Southern Vietnam promptly instructed the Western Inter-Zone Party Committee, directly the Long Chau Ha Provincial Party Committee, to conduct an immediate review, resolve the situation thoroughly and quickly overcome the consequences, stabilize the situation and border work. The Central Office for Southern Vietnam requested relevant local Party committees to consistently implement the Central Office for Southern Vietnam's directive, which is: "Unite with friends to develop the revolutionary movement and resistance activities against the French colonialists in the region along with the common resistance movement, both to destroy the French plot to close the border and to create coordination to form a common battlefield between the two sides" [1]. Implementing the Directive of the Central Office for Southern Vietnam, the Long Chau Ha Provincial Party Committee launched a major review, comprehensively re-evaluating the leadership of the Provincial Party Committee, clearly recognizing the limitations and shortcomings.

points in the Party's leadership and propose some active measures to overcome them

This situation, while strengthening border cells.

In mid-1954, the Central Bureau organized a conference of the Central Bureau of the South with the Cambodian Executive Committee, summarizing the situation and leadership activities to support the revolution in Cambodia, identifying 7 key tasks in the immediate future: Maintaining and promoting guerrilla warfare, fighting and destroying encroachments, expanding guerrilla zones and guerrilla bases; Strengthening enemy propaganda work against conscription to destroy the enemy's plot of "using Cambodia to kill Cambodia, using Cambodia to kill Vietnam and Laos"; improving and nurturing the people's strength in terms of economy and culture; educating and nurturing Cambodian cadres, consolidating the Party; developing and consolidating the national solidarity front and the Cambodian-Vietnamese-Laotian alliance, organizing the Farmers' Association for National Salvation in the Khum; Consolidating the government at all levels; Strengthening the work of temporarily occupied areas [200].

The above-determined tasks clearly demonstrated the role and effective assistance of the Central Bureau to the revolutionary movement of the Cambodian people as well as to strengthening the solidarity between Vietnam and Cambodia in the context of the Indochinese Communist Party having "transformed" and developed into 3 parties of 3 ethnic groups.

2.2.2. Leadership of the struggle after the Geneva Agreement, change of direction

Southern revolutionary movement (from July to the end of 1954)

2.2.2.1. Leading the work of troop transfer and assembly

The great victories of the Vietnamese people and the people of Laos and Cambodia in the 9-year resistance war, especially the historic Dien Bien Phu victory, forced the French colonialists to sign the Geneva Agreement (July 21, 1954) to end the war, restore peace in Indochina, and respect the independence, freedom, and territorial integrity of the people of the three countries. The resistance war against the French colonialists ended in victory, and in compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Agreement, the Party led the transfer of troops and the regrouping of revolutionary armed forces to the North.

Leading the preparation and implementation of troop movement is one of the major key tasks, requiring the highest efforts of the Central Office for Southern Vietnam and Party committees at all levels in the South. Conducted in extremely complicated circumstances, the Central

The Southern Department issued a number of directives directing Party committees at all levels to strictly and thoroughly keep secret matters related to the troop transfer plan, and absolutely keep secret the list of cadres and party members who went to the North or stayed in the South, in order to ensure the success of the troop transfer and at the same time ensure the safety of cadres and party members who will operate later.

For comrades who volunteered to stay in their localities to work, the Central Office for Southern Vietnam agreed and instructed the provinces of Vinh Tra, Ben Tre, and the Ca Mau assembly area to arrange and create conditions for the remaining cadres to be able to stay close to the people and operate in the upcoming political struggle.

Implementing the Armistice Agreement, the armed forces of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam moved to the assembly area in Ham Tan, Ca Mau, Dong Thap, preparing to move troops to the North.

While implementing the Party's regrouping policy, many Party committees at all levels loosened their leadership, and erroneous ideas emerged, such as thinking that regrouping was " to escape the enemy and to gain personal benefits " [183;184]. These mistakes affected grassroots organizations in communes and districts. In Long Chau Ha, many communes had up to 50 cadres going to regroup. Many cadres from provinces with temporarily occupied guerilla zones evacuated to the Bac Lieu base area demanding to go to regroup. There was a phenomenon of cadres selling their houses, fields and gardens to move their families to the North, etc. In the localities, gossip and rumors about the names of cadres who went and stayed and matters related to the troop transfer plan were widespread, with the risk of revealing secrets, while the enemy sent many spies into the regrouping area to investigate the number of cadres who stayed behind, with the aim of destroying and sabotaging the Party organization later.

In that situation, from May to September 1954, the Central Bureau issued many directives to correct the mistakes of local Party committees. At the same time, the Central Bureau reminded the provincial Party committees to firmly grasp and implement key tasks, in which the first task was to carry out organizational change. The Central Bureau requested the provincial Party committees to:

Strengthen secret party cells, party cells firmly grasp the core sub-groups of

Party cells at the grassroots level, focusing on party members from the poor, the elderly, and the disabled.

middle-peasants to be the backbone of the struggle. Provincial Party Committee members temporarily go down to the districts to help the district Party Committees. Grasp the core sub-groups in the Party's mass organizations at the commune level as the center for organizational work. Regarding organizational forms: turn our mass organizations into disguised organizational forms that operate openly legally and semi-legally [189].

Then, on October 23, 1954, the Central Office of the South issued Resolution No. 13/NQ-TWC, Resolution on Organizing the Party Committee for Military Transfer and Party Organization in the Civilian Party Forces to strengthen the leadership of the Party ; thoroughly understand that the military transfer to the North was a large-scale, difficult, and complicated military transfer; clearly recognize the responsibility and determination to successfully complete the military transfer. In the 200-day military transfer area of Ca Mau, after carefully considering the ethics and working capacity of the cadres, the Central Office of the South issued a Directive deciding to organize the Party Committee for Military Transfer in the Ca Mau area. This organization was responsible for leading the military transfer of the entire Ca Mau area to the North and was directly responsible to the Central Office of the South. The Party Committee members included comrades: Duong Quoc Chinh, Deputy Secretary, Commander of the Western Inter-Zone; Comrades Nguyen Chanh and Bui Van Du, members of the Military-Civilian-Government Assembly Committee of the Western Inter-Zone [211].

The Provincial Military Transfer Party Committee is under the direct leadership of the Regional Military Transfer Party Committee, responsible for leading the military transfer within the province. The members of the Provincial Military Transfer Party Committee include the Regimental Committee and 1 comrade from the Civilian Party force assembled according to the regiment. The specific personnel of the Party Committee will be proposed by the provinces, agreed by the Regional Party Committee and must be approved by the Central Office of Southern Vietnam.

The Central Office of the South clearly defined the scope of responsibility of the Party Committee organizations transferring troops: They are only responsible for leading the transfer of troops, while the force building belongs entirely to the Military Region Committee and the Command, the Corps Committees and the Regimental Commands. All the Military and Civilian Forces after

The company is organized into a unit and the comrades in the company are organized into a Party cell; if there are many Party cells, there is a joint leadership cell.

The close direction of the Central Bureau contributed to the success of the troop transfer and regrouping.

2.2.2.2. Struggle to demand the enemy to implement the Geneva Agreement and protect the people.

After the Geneva Conference on the issue of ceasefire in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and the restoration of peace in Indochina was signed, on September 6, 1954, the Central Party Politburo issued a Resolution on the new situation, new tasks and new policies of the Party . The Resolution clearly stated the Party's tasks in the South in the current period as follows:

Lead the people of the South to fight to implement the Armistice Agreement, consolidate peace, implement freedom and democracy... improve people's lives, achieve unification and gain independence. At the same time, we must lead the people to fight against acts of terrorism, suppression and destruction of our bases and revolutionary masses, against the enemy's and puppet's offensive actions, and preserve the interests of the masses that were won during the resistance war, especially in our old base areas and guerrilla bases [69, p.287].

The slogan of the South's struggle was "Vietnam, peace, unity, independence, democracy"; implementing a broad united front policy to expand influence, gain widespread support and sympathy both domestically and internationally.

On October 6, 1954, the Secretariat sent a telegram to the Central Office of the South, assessing the situation and new working policies in the South, clearly stating the French-American conflict, the conflict between pro-French and pro-American groups, the Central Office of the South must have a strategy to take advantage of the enemy's conflict, mobilize the establishment of a less pro-American government, focus on fighting against the US, and overthrow the Ngo Dinh Diem government.

Two months later, in the telegram sent to the Central Office of Southern Vietnam on December 6, 1954, (replying to the telegram of the Central Office of Southern Vietnam on some issues of division and identification of enemies)

(Regarding the enemy in the South, November 18), the Secretariat emphasized: In propaganda, raise the slogan "Fight against American imperialism, pro-French elements sabotaging the Armistice Agreement and their lackeys", but it is necessary to narrow the scope of attack, point the spearhead of the struggle at American imperialism to take advantage of dividing the enemy, stir up more enemy conflicts while creating favorable conditions for economic, cultural and diplomatic relations with France...

Immediately after the successful end of the resistance war against the French colonialists, according to the wishes of comrade Le Duan and with the consent of the Party Central Committee, Le Duan immediately returned to the South. At the end of June 1954, he and a delegation of Southern cadres from the Viet Bac War Zone arrived at War Zone D (Southeastern Vietnam), conveying the warm regards of the Party Central Committee and President Ho Chi Minh to the army and people of the South. He instructed the army and people of the South to continue carrying out revolutionary tasks in the new situation.

In the South, promoting the spirit of sticking to reality, being proactive and flexible in leading the struggle, 6 days after the Agreement on Ceasefire and Restoration of Peace in Vietnam and Indochina was signed, the Central Office for Southern Vietnam issued Directive No. 1/CT-GN on Propaganda, explanation and mobilization of the people, cadres and army to enthusiastically welcome the great victory of Geneva and resolutely strive to ensure the implementation of the ceasefire agreements . The Directive required Party committees at all levels to "quickly, urgently and rapidly" propagate among the people and the army in accordance with the direction of the Party Central Committee with the aim of making the entire Party, army and people unify their assessment and action in the face of the new situation, creating an atmosphere of excitement and trust and promoting the struggle activities to implement the Agreement [174].

Ideological work was also a difficult problem for the South at this time. The Central Office for Southern Vietnam directed Party committees at all levels to pay attention to propaganda and explain to cadres, party members and people the ideological stance on choosing the 17th parallel as a temporary boundary, our consistent stance was to resolutely fight to unify the country. In addition, we must pay close attention to combating erroneous thoughts such as excessive optimism, leading to a lack of vigilance against enemy plots.

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