Summary of Strategic Hamlet Establishment Work by Mid-April 1963

In the Tactical Zones, government representatives are responsible for regular contact with the Commander of the Tactical Zone to meet requests for military and security support. Division-level military units stationed in the tactical zones are responsible for providing military support for the process of concentrating people to establish ACLs at the military base. According to Decree No. 152-NV dated July 12, 1962, the RVN government established in each tactical zone 11, 12, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33 a "Committee in charge of strategic hamlets" with the Commander of the Tactical Zone as Chairman, and the provincial chiefs and representatives of other agencies as members. At the provincial level and equivalent, there must be a "Provincial Strategic Hamlet Construction Committee" chaired by the Provincial Governor, the Deputy Provincial Governor in charge of internal security, the Commander of Security and Civil Defense as Vice Chairmen, and the Heads of the Information, Youth, Public Works, Health, Police and the Head of the Pacification Cadre Group as members. At the District level and equivalent, there is a "District Strategic Hamlet Construction Committee" chaired by the District Chief, the Deputy District Chief as Vice Chairmen, and a number of leaders of security agencies, police, etc. at the District level as members. At the commune level, a "Commune Strategic Hamlet Construction Committee" is organized, and a "Strategic Hamlet Construction Cadre Group" is established. Specifically, the RVN government used 7 types of forces for coordination, including: main force, security, civil defense, police, reconnaissance, civil defense and rural construction cadres. Each ACL has a Hamlet Management Board, headed by hamlet chiefs, deputy hamlet chiefs and the fighting youth force, police, and secret service. The Republic of Vietnam government divided the people into 3 categories for inspection and supervision:

“Type 1: is a revolutionary family or one that sympathizes with the revolution to monitor, arrest, and suppress if there is any connection with the revolution;

Type 2: are families that are in the middle of the spectrum and are easy to bribe, entice, entice, and sow discord; Type 3: are families that have contributed to the Saigon government, they have preferential policies and use them to monitor and control the people in the hamlet" [78, p.51].

To gradually implement the ACL program throughout the South, political advisor Ngo Dinh Nhu instructed: strategic hamlets must be established based on the principle that first in the security zone (areas controlled by the RVN government), then in the semi-security zone (disputed area), then in the insecurity zone (areas controlled by the revolution) but not yet done.

Table 2.3: Summary of strategic hamlet establishment work up to mid-April 1963

Total population

14,076,336 people
Number of planned strategic hamlets	11,287 hamlets
Number of completed strategic hamlets	6,151 hamlets (54.5%)
Number of people in the hamlet	8,190,010 people (58.5%)
Number of strategic hamlets being implemented	2,172 hamlets (19%)
Number of people entering the hamlet	1,607,154 hamlets (11.5%)

Maybe you are interested!

Source: Ministry of Public Works and Transport – Republic of Vietnam (1963), Minutes No. 45 of the meeting on April 19, 1963 on Strategic Hamlets, National Archives Center II, Ho Chi Minh City, file code No. 311.

Regarding the budget for building ACL, according to Nguyen Ba Can: “The strategic hamlet budget is a budget in cash entirely from US aid, spent first, proven later, to support the hamlets. Next to it is a warehouse to manage materials supported by US aid from barbed wire, iron stakes, cement, flour, sugar, etc.” [57, p.147]. Through statistical table 2.3, it can be seen that in the fiscal year 1961-1962, US aid accounted for more than 50% of the budget for building ACL, if we add about 10% of aid from Australia and West Germany, then foreign aid for building ACL accounted for more than 60%. By the fiscal year 1962-1963, the RVN government had tripled the national budget to show the priority of the RVN government in implementing the ACL national policy. The US and the RVN government considered 1963 to be a decisive year in the ACL program, so they increased investment in the ACL program in 1963 to 7,617 million RVN dollars, an 8-fold increase compared to 1962 [146, p.490].

Table 2.4: Statistics on budget for building strategic hamlets in the years 1961 - 1962 and 1962 - 1963

Unit: VND

Strategic hamlet construction budget

Total amount
1. Current budget
National Budget (Fiscal Year 1961 – 1962)	100,000,000 VND
Private organizations voluntarily contribute to the ACL Trung fund. nursery	44,716,192 VND

United States Aid (Fiscal Year 1961 – 1962)

730,000,000 VND
Countervailing funds for the Binh Minh and Hai Yen campaigns and ACLs and ACĐs in provinces damaged by storms and floods	58,353,470 VND
Total	933,069,662 VND
2. Unused funds
National Budget (Fiscal Year 1962 – 1963)	300,000,000 VND
Australian Aid	40,000,000 VND
German Aid	131,250,000 VND
Total	471,250,000 VND

Source: Inter-ministerial Committee in charge of strategic hamlets (1963), Situation of strategic hamlet construction work up to mid-October 1963, National Archives Center II, file code number 116.

Based on the terrain of each area and the characteristics of the population, the RVN government used three main measures: One was to establish land, encircle people, and establish hamlets on the spot according to the area of each hamlet, each village, and even each commune. Two was to establish land and encircle people on the spot, while at the same time forcing a part of the population from other scattered areas or residents with "pro-communist" elements to live in between for easy control. Three was to use military and police forces to organize sweeping operations, burn down houses, destroy fields, crops, and force people to establish ACLs in the planned areas.

The view of the RVN government on the defense of the ACL is:

“The defense of the Strategic Hamlets must be placed within the framework of a revolutionary struggle, applying guerrilla and counter-guerrilla tactics with two aspects: The surface: defense on the ground, undertaken by armed units; The underground: secret guerrillas must use secret forms of terrain organization and be undertaken by core and loyal political cadres.

The organization of the terrain can change depending on the strategic nature of the hamlet. In insecure areas or in poor areas, a complete system of defensive fortifications must be built. In secure areas, only a strategic fence and a few necessary fortifications are needed to mobilize armed people's organizations when necessary." [144, p.1]

To build the ACL, the RVN government created a plan to organize the terrain and divided it into 3 phases:

“Phase 1: Observe the terrain, plan to organize the terrain, organize people to implement the study plan, prepare tools and materials.

Phase 2: build fortifications according to the studied plan. Phase 3: consolidate and complete the work" [144, p.2].

To complete a strategic hamlet, the RVN government set out 8 criteria that must be met:

- Eliminated communist agents and coordinated with the police, commune council, and hamlet chief to inspect human and material resources in strategic hamlets.

- Coordinated with Public Affairs and Information to mobilize the masses to organize into people's organizations.

- Has instructed and assigned all classes of people about their duties in normal times and in times of trouble.

- Completed fences, spikes, trenches, and sealed tunnels in each house.

- Secretly organized two special forces sub-teams for each strategic hamlet.

- Organized a "secret" election of the executive board and established a village covenant.

- Trained and armed young men to fight.

- Organized information and communication systems to request reinforcements [79, pp.48-49].

According to R. Thompson, as of August 1963, the total number of strategic hamlets established throughout the South was as follows: [152, p.138] (Table 2.5)

Table 2.5: Total number of strategic hamlets established throughout the South as of August 1963

Month

Number of ACLs completed	Number of ACLs increasing every month
7 – 1962	2,559	-
8 – 1962	2,661	102
9 – 1962	3,089	428
10 – 1962	3.225	136
11 – 1962.	3,550	325
12 – 1962	4,080	530

1 – 1963

4.441	361
2 – 1963	5,049	608
3 – 1963	5,332	283
4 – 1963	5,787	455
5 – 1963	6.222	439
6 – 1963	6,872	646
7 – 1963	7,222	348
8 – 1963	8,095	875

In the coastal provinces of South Central Vietnam, in the face of the growing revolutionary movement, in early 1961, the US and the Republic of Vietnam government stepped up conscription, increased the mobile army to 64,000 troops including 4 divisions, and increased the security force to

20,000 troops including 4 battalions and 126 companies, the US advisory force increased to 3,000 people. Along with the increase in troops, the US and the RVN government also increased weapons and means of war, especially helicopters. By mid-1961, the US - RVN government began implementing the plan to "pacify" the ACL fence in the delta and through the anti-insurgency program, gathered people. By early 1962, the ARVN army here increased to 155,000 (nearly half of the total number of ARVN troops in the South) including 6 divisions, 18 security battalions, 5,000 US advisors and planned to build 2,043 ACLs in Tactical Zone I, 2,956 in Tactical Zone II [73, p.304]. The US and the RVN government determined that each province had a focus for establishing ACL, in which Quang Ngai was a focus for building ACL. Ngo Dinh Nhu personally commanded the construction of the ACL system in Quang Ngai, including the "model hamlet" Kim Sa (Tinh Tho commune, Son Tinh district). Here, the RVN government forced more than 10,000 people to complete the construction of a solid hamlet in the style of "two rivers, three mountains" within 7 days at all costs (the hamlet was fenced with three layers of barbed wire and iron stakes, 2 rows of deep trenches in between the layers of fence, and dense spikes underneath). The local government strictly prohibited people from gathering, restricted travel, and forced landless farmers to sign land-tenancy contracts with landlords.

In Quang Da - Quang Nam 14 : from mid-1961, the RVN government promoted the concentration of people to establish ACLs, focusing on the western areas of the districts along the mountain border. The initial plan was to organize ACL fences according to the rural terrain, focusing only on households with relations to the revolution and scattered households. In 1962, the concentration of people to establish ACLs was expanded to all rural areas, forcing people from two or three villages into one ACL, forcing people to fence each hamlet with two or three layers of fences (the RVN government called it "two rivers, three mountains"). Each ACL had only one or two entrance and exit gates and was closely guarded day and night. In the hamlet, the RVN government classified the people, arranged families with relations to the revolution to live in separate areas deep in the hamlet, with a list in front of the house, and anyone who was absent had to ask for permission. By the end of 1962, they had established 200 ACLs here (125 hamlets in 1962 alone) with nearly 400,000 people [6, p.422].

In Quang Ngai: as one of the key areas for the construction of ACLs by the US and the RVN government, they established detention areas for people suspected of being involved in the revolution, strictly controlled the border areas, especially the traffic routes such as Thach Tru (Mo Duc) to Ba To, Dong Ke (Son Tinh) to Son Ha..., and stipulated that farmers with less than 3 sao of land without a landlord's land were forced to go to the communal fields or ACLs. With the above tricks, by the end of 1961, the RVN government had gathered people, established 216 ACLs, and gathered

513,280 people (accounting for more than 64% of the province's population at that time) [7, p.183]. By 1962, the RVN government stepped up the reform of the local military force, building 12 concentration camps in the mountainous areas, most of which were in Minh Long and Son Ha districts. In the first 10 months of 1963, the RVN army launched 375 sweeps, the largest being the "Phoenix" and "Trung Nghia" campaigns, fiercely attacking the districts of Ba To, Son Ha, Minh Long, Son Tinh, and Duc Pho. With fierce attacks, in 1963, they established 525 ACLs with 446,000 people (in the mountainous areas, there were 51 hamlets) [7, p.194].

In Binh Dinh: to force people into ACL, the US and the Republic of Vietnam government continuously opened

14 At the end of 1962, the expanded provincial party committee conference divided Quang Nam - Da Nang into two provinces, including Quang Nam province corresponding to Quang Tin province of the Saigon government (Quang Nam's border from Que Son district to the border of Quang Ngai province) and Quang Da province (Quang Da province's border from Duy Xuyen district, Hoi An to the border of Thua Thien Hue province, including Da Nang).

Sweeping operations such as the "Dong Tien" sweep (March 1962) attacked Vinh Hiep, An Son, Hoai Nhon, Hoai My, My Thanh, My Tho, Cat Hiep, Cat Hanh with the aim of forcing people into ACL; the "Dan Tien" sweep (September 1962) swept back and forth a large area from the Northwest of Hoai Nhon to Hoai An, An Lao and the Northeast of Vinh Thanh; the "Dan Thang" sweep (June 1963) used the "helicopter transport" tactic to sweep the An Lao - Vinh Thanh - Van Canh area. By July 1963, the RVN government had built 460 hamlets in the plains, including 180 "two rivers, three mountains" hamlets with a population of

513,588 people (the whole province had about 800,000 people) [2, p.76]. In addition, the ARVN also established a number of "strategic hamlets" in key areas: An Do (Hoai Son), Kim Son (An Nghia), Thach Ban, Long Dinh (Cat Son, Cat Hiep) to block the revolutionary attacks to the plains, and step up the construction of local combat forces (civil defense, youth fighters), in order to turn ACL into a fortress to conduct a "war for the people".

In Phu Yen: From July 1961 to the end of 1962, the RVN government established 157 ACLs in the style of "two rivers, three mountains", surrounded by underground fortifications, each hamlet had a militia force, around the hamlets the enemy forced people to cut down trees, dug trenches inside, and placed guards to control and suppress the masses [11, p.193]. To fight against the revolution, the RVN government tried to strengthen the repressive apparatus in the countryside and organized in each commune a republican youth platoon, a militia platoon; in large communes there was a security company to conduct sweeps and terrorize the people. The Republic of Vietnam government built a number of ACLs in strategically important areas such as: Hon Lup ACL (Son Long commune, Son Hoa district), Phu Hoi hamlet (Xuan Phuoc) and Lanh Xuan hamlet (Xuan Lanh, Dong Xuan), Mua Cua hamlet, My Luong (Xuan Tho, Song Cau), Nui Mieu hamlet (Hoa Quang, Tuy Hoa town). Along with the concentration of people to establish ACLs, the US and the Diem government implemented the three wilderness policies of "burn all, kill all, rob all". By early May 1962, the Republic of Vietnam army mobilized a large force including: Main force regiment 47, a commando battalion, an engineer battalion, 4 commando companies, 17 security companies, 81 militia generals, 40 youth combat platoons, an M113 vehicle squadron (20 vehicles), a heavy artillery company with 4 105mm guns, 2 155mm guns, a battle group

Binh Phu, 2 naval fleets, 45 aircraft of various types launched the "Hai Yen" campaign to attack Tuy Hoa district, the base area of the western Son Hoa, the western Tuy An and Dong Xuan districts, forcing more than 30,000 people into the Hon Lup, Xuan Lanh and Nui Mieu ACLs. After nearly 1 month of conducting the Hai Yen campaign, the Phu Yen Governor reported at the Strategic Hamlet Conference on May 30, 1962 in Nha Trang:

“The establishment of strategic hamlets in Phu Yen was part of the so-called “Hai Yen campaign” which divided Phu Yen province into three zones. The red zone was the area controlled by the Viet Cong, the green zone was the disputed area, the yellow zone was the national controlled area such as Dong Tre, La Hai, Song Cau, Phu Tan, Tuy Hoa, Phu Lam, Cung Son, Duc Binh and the surrounding areas. Currently, the national control is 148,610 people, the Viet Cong control 126,543 people, the green zone is the disputed area with 87,234 people. The situation of building strategic hamlets in Phu Yen as of May 30, 1962, Tuy Hoa district planned to build 30 new hamlets but completed 2 hamlets, Tuy An district planned to build 36 new hamlets but completed 5 hamlets, Song Cau district planned to build 19 new hamlets but completed 5 hamlets, Dong Xuan district planned to build 10 new hamlets but completed 5 hamlets" [59, p.151].

From August 1962, the ARVN shifted its focus to Tuy Hoa 1 and Son Hoa. In Son Hoa district alone, the ARVN burned more than 15,000 houses, shot and killed and robbed more than 10,000 buffaloes and cows. After the "Hai Yen" campaign, the ARVN launched the "Dan Thang" campaign, focusing on attacking deep into the revolutionary base area, encroaching on border areas and traffic routes, forcing people to abandon their villages and fields to live in ACLs. By October 1963, the ARVN government had established 228 ACLs (37 more than in 1962) [83, p.226].

In Khanh Hoa: according to the report of the Khanh Hoa provincial governor at the Strategic Hamlet Conference on May 30, 1962, by 1962, 281 hamlets had been established out of a total of 326 hamlets in 77 communes [4, p.382]. Depending on the specific situation in each place, they forced people to build according to the following models: 1 river 1 mountain or 2 rivers 2 mountains, meaning 1 trench and 1 moat or 2 trenches and 2 moats running parallel to each other surrounding the hamlet. The fence was on average 2 meters high, the moat was on average 1.5 meters deep, and 2.5 meters wide or more [4, p.383]. Spikes were planted under the moat and on the inside edge of the moat. In addition, there were

Comment