Vietnam Banking System 2010 – 2012


Chapter 2 Conclusion


Chapter 2 has built the model, research hypotheses and determined the research method. To test the relationship between owners and operators and the role of the Board of Directors in resolving this relationship, the thesis uses the situational analysis method and the regression method.

For the case analysis, the thesis evaluates conflicts of interest and the role of the Board of Directors in resolving conflicts of interest at two Vietnamese commercial banks based on the corporate governance principles of the OECD and the Basel Committee.

For the regression method, the thesis tests (i) the relationship between the separation of ownership and management rights with the efficiency of asset use and costs of the bank, (ii) the relationship between the control role of the Board of Directors with costs and efficiency of asset use of the bank. The testing is carried out through 4 research hypotheses.

The scope of the study is Vietnamese commercial banks in the period 2010 - 2012.


CHAPTER 3

RESULTS OF THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF REPRESENTATIVES IN VIETNAM'S BANKING SYSTEM BY QUALITATIVE METHOD


With research data and qualitative research methods in chapter 2, the thesis analyzes the conflict of interests between owners and operators and the role of the Board of Directors of two Vietnamese commercial banks in the period 2010-2012 and gives the following results.

3.1 Vietnam banking system in the period 2010 - 2012

The period 2010 - 2012 was the period when Vietnam's economy and the financial and banking system experienced many fluctuations: economic growth declined after the global financial crisis in 2008, the banking system was restructured. The banking system also revealed weaknesses during this period.

Commercial banking management

In the previous period, many joint stock commercial banks were established. This made it easier for investors to raise capital and transfer ownership of banks, without interrupting business operations and allowing them to continue to inherit the business results of the previous period of the bank. On the other hand, the trend of bank equitization created many monitoring channels, making information in the banking sector more transparent, contributing to creating a healthier financial system. However, the strong development of the Vietnamese banking system in previous years, along with loose regulations on governance, has led to a complex cross-ownership network and increased systemic risks. The organizational structure and ownership of shares of banks in Vietnam are very complicated. In addition to the State controlling and appointing representatives to manage state-owned commercial banks, most economic groups and state-owned corporations own banks. Typically, the Group


Vietnam Electricity Group owns An Binh Commercial Joint Stock Bank, Military Telecommunications Group owns Military Commercial Joint Stock Bank (MB), Vietnam Coal - Mineral Industries Group and Rubber Group own Saigon - Hanoi Commercial Joint Stock Bank, Vietnam Oil and Gas Group owns Ocean Commercial Joint Stock Bank, etc. State-owned banks such as BIDV, Vietcombank, Vietinbank, Agribank also own other banks.

In addition, the ownership of commercial banks is also carried out by other commercial banks or enterprises. For example, Maritime Commercial Joint Stock Bank owns Military Bank and Mekong Development Bank. More complicated is the case of ACB Bank owning EximBank, but EximBank also owns Saigon - Thuong Tin Commercial Joint Stock Bank. In addition, ACB also owns other banks such as Dai A, Kien Long, and Vietnam Thuong Tin.

When the GDP growth of the economy is low, banking activities are still profitable. In 2009, the year when banks implemented the 4% interest rate support program, bank profits increased significantly. The issue of concern here is: banks can accept high risks to gain high profits, and if this risk occurs, depositors and related parties must bear it. Bank staff already receive salaries based on annual business results, which are already high. Thus, banks gain many benefits from accepting high risks but only bear few costs for doing so. However, if the government still advocates supporting banks to prevent them from collapsing, the costs related to risks and increased risks will put pressure on the budget.

In this context, bank governance plays a particularly important role because a good governance mechanism will help banks resolve conflicts of interest among parties.

Financial intermediary function

The poor financial intermediary function of the banking system is reflected in low capital circulation efficiency and unreasonable capital allocation. Meanwhile, banks


still enjoy profits. If risks occur and if the Government does not have an appropriate handling mechanism, related parties such as small shareholders, depositors, etc. will all suffer losses. One of the indicators reflecting the efficiency of financial intermediation of banks is the difference between deposit interest rates and lending interest rates. This difference is on average 3% in the world and in the region, then banks can cover costs and make profits (VTTu Anh, 2012). In fact, this difference in the US is about 3%, in Singapore it is about 3 - 4%, and in Thailand it is 5%. Meanwhile, in 2012, according to the latest regulations of the State Bank, the short-term deposit interest rate is 9%/year, and the lending interest rate is brought down to 15%/year, then this difference in our country is 6%. However, from 2013 to now, the difference between lending and deposit interest rates has tended to decrease, at 3% - 4%. This interest rate difference does not include additional fees paid to banks so that customers can conveniently borrow capital and continue production and business. Therefore, the actual difference may be higher. From 2010 to 2013, the banking system still announced profits. However, in 2012, the banking system's profits decreased by 60% compared to 2011. In 2013, profits increased by 40% compared to 2012, but did not reach the level of 2010.

Asset structure and quality

The allocation of outstanding loans to sectors is not reasonable. Lending to sectors directly involved in production such as agriculture and forestry is still low, while lending to construction, commerce and personal activities serving the community is still high.

Lending to economic organizations and individuals still accounts for a large proportion of total outstanding bank loans, however, this figure has tended to decrease from 98% in 2008 to 95% in 2011, and to 89.10% in 2012. On the other hand, the growth rate of outstanding loans to economic organizations and individuals in 2011 and 2012 also decreased, reaching only 14% and 11.07% respectively, compared to an average of more than 30% in previous years. This shows that banks with surplus liquidity tend to prioritize lending to the interbank market. For economic organizations and individuals in need of capital, access to loans has increased more slowly than before, not only because of the economic recession and businesses borrowing sparingly, but also because banks are cautious about increasing outstanding loans for fear of bad debt.


In addition, lending in the interbank market has increased sharply. In 2008, lending in the interbank market was about 19,000 billion. By 2011, this figure was about 105,000 billion VND and in 2012 it was about 325,000 billion VND, leading to the capital dependence of banks on the interbank market increasing, and the level is relatively fast. Capital support between banks is extremely necessary but we need to maintain it within the allowable level.

(Unit: Billion VND)


Lending on TT2

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

Lending on TT2

40,000

20,000

0

Q4 2007 Q4 2008 Q4 2009 Q4 2010 Q4 2011


Figure 3.1. Lending on TT2

Source: Bank reports


However, since 2012, deposit mobilization from market 2 has decreased.

Lending activities to other credit institutions account for a small proportion of total outstanding loans but have increased significantly over the years (1.66% in 2008 to 4.22% in 2011 and increased sharply to 10.9% in 2012).

High credit risk and bad debt.

Bad debt and overdue debt of the banking system have increased rapidly since 2011. According to the announcement of the State Bank in 2011 and 2012, bad debt is about 3% to 8% of total outstanding debt. Bad debt data announced by the State Bank fluctuates continuously, showing that the bad debt situation is complicated. The scale and severity of bad debt have not been determined.


The risk provisioning ratio is assessed by the State Bank as insufficient and much lower than the 70-100% level in the banking system in other emerging economies .


Figure 3.2. GDP growth and credit growth


Since 2010, bad debts have appeared at credit institutions. Thus, it can be seen that even for borrowers who are credit institutions, credit quality has declined. This could be a warning sign for the banking system.

Debt structure

The debt structure has shifted in an unsustainable direction with the proportion of capital mobilized from the population and economic organizations decreasing, and loans from credit institutions and other loans increasing.

During the period 2008 - 2011, although mobilized capital grew at a high rate, reaching an average of 26.46%/year during the whole period, the rate of capital mobilized from residents and economic organizations compared to total capital had a slow growth rate from 65% in 2008 to 58% in 2011, the proportion of borrowed capital on total capital increased from 3.11% in 2008 to 8.19% in 2011 and mobilization from other credit institutions on total capital increased from 14% to 18% in the same period. However, since 2012, the growth rate of mobilized capital has decreased sharply to only 0.8%, the proportion compared to total capital.


Capital sources mobilized from the population and economic organizations and mobilized from other credit institutions tended to fluctuate in the opposite direction compared to the period 2008 - 2011, reaching 66% and 8% respectively, the proportion of borrowed capital on total capital sources continued to increase, reaching 10% (Table 3.1).

Capital mobilization is mainly concentrated in short terms while the credit structure has not changed accordingly, leading to a prolonged imbalance in terms of terms and liquidity stress over the past many years.

Table 3.1: Mobilized capital, borrowed capital in total capital

Source: Bank reports


Year

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Capital mobilized

82%

80%

78%

79%

76%

74%

Mobilize TT1

66%

65%

64%

62%

58%

66%

Mobilize TT2

16%

14%

14%

17%

18%

8%

Loan capital

3%

3%

8%

7%

8%

10%

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3.2 Commercial bank management in the Vietnamese banking system

The management of Vietnamese commercial banks has had positive changes. New regulations on management have been issued, amended and supplemented. Typically, the Law on Credit Institutions 2010 3 has dedicated a chapter with 8 sections and 60 articles on the organization and management of credit institutions, providing general regulations and specific regulations for each type of organization, especially issues on the Board of Directors, Board of Members, Board of Supervisors, rights and obligations and standards and conditions of the organizations.

members of these departments. Information disclosure by banks has made significant progress, increasing in quantity and improving in quality. Corporate governance has also changed significantly but still has limitations.

Legal regulations in banking activities have an incomplete impact on governance practices, low enforcement capacity, and lack of consistency:



3 The Law on Credit Institutions was passed on June 16, 2010 and took effect on January 1, 2011.


- Currently, banking activities are regulated by the Law on Credit Institutions, the Law on the State Bank, the Law on Enterprises (mandatory for all types of banks), the Law on Securities (for listed or IPO banks) and sub-law documents such as the decree on deposit insurance activities, the decree on bankruptcy, etc. Compared to enterprises in general, the regulations for banks set higher and stricter requirements. However, from the perspective of practical implementation of the laws, some sub-law documents are being applied inappropriately, leading to the goal of ensuring safety and efficiency in banking activities not being well implemented. Currently, there is a lack of documents applying best practices or new trends in the market. This can be seen in regulations such as regulations on capital safety ratios which have a large gap compared to practices, lack of guidance on measuring, recording, and managing risks for derivative instruments, operational risks, and no clear regulations on business acquisitions. Bankruptcy regulations are not effective.

- Some documents are situational and administrative in nature such as interest rate ceilings and gold trading controls. This shows that the market orientation of policies is still limited. However, since 2012, interest rate management policies have become more proactive and market oriented, showing that the market orientation of policies has improved.

- Low enforcement capacity leads to low enforcement effectiveness. According to the assessment and survey of the banking system in 2010, up to 30% of the number of banks with information on independent and non-executive board members did not meet the required half level. According to Tran Thi Thanh Tu et al. (2011), although the standards for independent members have been prescribed, in reality, in some cases, independent members do not meet these standards.

Coordination among agencies performing the functions of supervision, management and enforcement, including the State Bank of Vietnam, the Ministry of Finance, the Securities Commission, the National Financial Supervision Commission, the Business Registration Authority, the Court and other agencies, is not good. This affects the effectiveness of supervision.

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