The Party Committee of the Army led the building of logistics forces in the resistance war against the US to save the country from 1969 to 1975

Different effective and practical methods to continuously improve all aspects, promptly meeting combat and production requirements.

Second, promote increased production.

Practicing increased production is the most practical and effective measure to be frugal in the combat and working conditions of the People's Army.

Under the leadership and direction of the Central Military Commission and the Ministry of National Defense, the movement to increase production and self-sufficiency in food in agencies and units has been organized and implemented relatively closely. The measures: defining tasks and production targets for each person and each unit; allocating time and resources to implement; building rear areas, investing capital, materials, techniques, etc. at appropriate levels for production and animal husbandry have brought about good results. Overcoming difficulties in terrain and weather conditions, fierce attacks by the enemy, units have actively organized increased production, maintained and developed concentrated rear areas for growing crops and raising animals, both having professional production forces and mobilizing all troops to participate seasonally. In addition, agencies and units also organize production and raising animals around their military bases and exploit, gather, and hunt natural products to improve their daily lives. In the conditions of destructive war, troops were dispersed, evacuated, and fought on the move, and units found appropriate ways to continue to maintain and develop increased production during wartime, such as: organizing increased production around the kitchen, around the house, raising livestock right on the battlefield, in trenches, carrying "pig cages", "chicken cages" when moving... Many units organized fixed farming and raising areas with appropriate scales. Some places relied on the people, borrowed land from the people for production between the two main crops of the year: contributed labor and capital to agricultural cooperatives to raise additional livestock outside the plan and then shared profits in kind with the troops... Increased production in general had good results; although the State's supply was limited, many units still maintained the quality of meals, some places even added reserves and gradually improved living conditions to ensure that the troops ate well and had enough according to quantitative standards even during the war.

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Along with actively increasing production is promoting technical and method improvements, rationalizing production to improve quality and production efficiency.

Repair, quality of military nutrition, care for wounded and sick soldiers achieved great results such as: the Quartermaster Department promoted research on food processing, improved cooking techniques, strived to reduce the use of coal and firewood; organized sports events, exchanged experiences in processing, cooking, and slaughtering; researched technical improvements, rationalized tailoring, organized mending and repairing in each unit, and collected military uniforms and equipment for reuse in production... which had great savings. The Transport Department promoted the movement to maintain motorbikes in good condition, drive safely, save gasoline, the movement to promote initiatives, rationalize production, improve techniques, take advantage of machinery and vehicle capacity, save materials and materials for road construction. The production force made many efforts to self-produce and improve some types of weapons and ammunition to meet the needs of use and to suit battlefield conditions and tactical requirements, and at the same time organized the production of some types of spare parts and vehicles to serve technical assurance...

The above vivid practice clearly shows that only by thoroughly grasping the viewpoint of being frugal, relying mainly on one's own strength, promoting production and making efforts to save in all areas of work can one build a strong logistics force, improve its capacity and quality, ensure and successfully complete all tasks of the logistics sector during the war.

Third, regularly manage and make good use of technical facilities.

Strictly managing, preserving, using reasonably, and fully promoting the effectiveness of all equipment, weapons, combat vehicles, and other logistics assets and materials is an important issue in maintaining and enhancing the strength of the People's Army, and the ability and quality of logistics support.

In order to manage and make good use of technical facilities during the war, the military and defense sector regularly educated, guided, and urged the implementation of logistics regimes, standards, and regulations for sectors in accordance with the requirements and conditions of the war; researched, developed, and issued a number of new standards and regimes during wartime. Actively organized training and fostering for logistics officers and staff at all levels and for unit commanders on management work and guidance on management skills. Maintained budgeting regimes, allocation and collection regimes, statistical registration regimes, performance reporting regimes, maintenance, repair, and reserve regimes, inspection and scoring regimes.

Periodic testing… Through implementing regimes to grasp the situation, detect errors, guide correction and handle violations when necessary. Regularly organize inspections and at some points have conducted general inspections, re-examined and evaluated all physical assets, both in warehouses at all levels, in units and on transportation routes; organize the collection and concentration of equipment, means of supplies, assets for classification, preservation, repair, handling… in all branches and levels in the entire army.

However, compared to the requirements, the management and use of technical facilities is still a weak point of the military and the military service. This is a major shortcoming, causing loss of assets, reducing the quality of military service, limiting the ability, quality assurance and part of the combat power of the armed forces.

The above successes and limitations show that: good management of technical facilities during war is one of the experiences to improve the quality of LLHC and enhance the ability to ensure logistics for the army.

Fourth, appreciate and effectively use material and technical assistance from international friends.

The Vietnamese people's revolutionary and industrialization movement received the wholehearted support and assistance of socialist countries and progressive peoples around the world. In terms of material and technical assistance, Vietnam received great help from socialist countries. In the revolutionary and industrialization movement, most socialist countries provided military aid to Vietnam. The assistance from these countries played a very important role in strengthening and improving the technical equipment of the Army to a new level.

Whether the material and technical support from socialist countries can be effective or not depends on the economic, political, military conditions, scientific and technical level, ability to ensure transportation, industrial level, etc. of the Vietnamese rear. Therefore, promoting the strength of the people's war rear is a fundamental and long-term content to be implemented based mainly on one's own strength and effectively using the material and technical support from fraternal countries.

During the war, the amount of material to ensure the needs of combat units on the battlefield is always growing, the enemy always finds ways to sabotage the logistics lines. Therefore, if each agency and unit strives to be frugal,

Preserving well, using durably, safely and economically the available technical facilities and those provided by fraternal countries, at the same time focusing on using the enemy's assets to fight the enemy and promoting the spirit of self-reliance, proactiveness and activeness in solving difficulties will create for ourselves and for the entire war great logistical capabilities. The combat practice in the KCCN and CN from 1969 to 1975 proved that: doing well in promoting the strength of the rear, striving to practice thrift, focusing on the management of technical facilities will both effectively use the available logistical capabilities and strongly promote the effect of the technical facilities provided by fraternal countries, increasing the ability to rely mainly on one's own strength on the logistical front.

The socialist brother countries have provided Vietnam with a lot of material assistance, including very modern weapons, combat vehicles and combat support vehicles. However, the reception, management, transportation and use of weapons, combat vehicles and combat support vehicles all depend on terrain conditions, weather, the ability to master science and technology, the characteristics of the Vietnamese people and the way of fighting the Vietnamese people's war. Therefore, to effectively use the technical facilities of the assisting countries requires all cadres, employees and soldiers in the logistics sector to promote research and study, master and use to the fullest capacity, and promote the effectiveness of the technical facilities that have been assisted, especially for modern, unsatisfactory, simple and conservative weapons and technical equipment. On the other hand, it is necessary to promote the spirit of independence, autonomy and creativity in the use of those technical facilities; Research, improve, and apply appropriately to combat targets, battlefield conditions, and Vietnamese fighting style, without mechanically following a stereotype.

Experience has shown that only by upholding the spirit of relying primarily on one's own strength can one have the conditions to effectively use the material and technical assistance of fraternal countries. On the other hand, by making good use of the assistance of fraternal countries, one will have more conditions to strengthen one's forces and better fulfill the requirement of relying primarily on one's own strength. That is the lesson of using international assistance with the spirit of relying primarily on one's own strength to solve the problems of building the People's Army and ensuring logistics in people's war.

Chapter 3 Conclusion

During the KCCX, CN from 1969 to 1975, under the leadership of the DeBQD, the LLHC has continuously grown and matured in all aspects, striving to excellently complete the assigned tasks. Achieving such results is due to: The DeBQD has regularly thoroughly grasped the political and military lines of the Party; the tasks of the armed forces and the army; correctly assessed the situation, clearly recognized the role of the CTHC, and proposed correct and creative leadership policies. At the same time, the DeBQD has always closely followed reality, promptly and closely directed the activities of building the LLHC in accordance with the characteristics of the situation and tasks of each agency and unit, close to the target. Under the leadership of the DeBQD, cadres, soldiers, and logistics staff at all levels have promoted revolutionary heroism to the highest extent, striving to successfully fulfill all tasks.

However, in the process of leading the construction of the LLHC from 1969 to 1975, the Military Region still had some limitations, leading to the LLHC not being truly strong in all aspects, and the quality and effectiveness of logistics support were not high. These limitations were due to the fact that the awareness of the Military Region did not keep up with the development of reality and war; the implementation direction was not strict and lacked depth. In addition, the fierce destruction of the US imperialists and their lackeys, the harshness of the terrain and weather conditions, and the multifaceted difficulties of the Vietnamese economy also influenced and hindered the process of building and developing the LLHC.

The process of the Party Central Committee leading the building of the LLHC during the KCCVN and CN from 1969 to 1975 was very rich and diverse, leaving behind many valuable experiences. Summarizing that process, four valuable experiences were drawn for reference and application in leading the building of the LLHC for the cause of building and defending the Socialist Republic of Vietnam today.

CONCLUDE

1. Based on the position and great role of the People's Public Security Forces during the war; from the characteristics of the situation, advantages and difficulties of the Vietnamese revolutionary practice in the years (1969 - 1975); from the plots and tricks of the US imperialists and their lackeys to sabotage the Vietnamese revolution; from the reality of the military People's Public Security Forces, especially the weaknesses that need to be overcome; especially from the requirements of building the Army and building the People's Public Security Forces to meet the requirements and revolutionary tasks in the final stage of the KCCVN, CN, QD-TTg proposed a policy of building the People's Public Security Forces in a comprehensive manner. That policy is:

Building a comprehensively strong People's Army capable of completing all tasks, according to the motto of building a revolutionary, disciplined, and modern People's Army. To realize that goal and motto, it is necessary to constantly grasp deeply and thoroughly implement the following viewpoints: firmly relying on the people, mobilizing and organizing the entire people to participate in building the People's Army; taking building a politically strong People's Army as the foundation; building a strong cadre team as the key step; building a strong strategic transport force as the central task; starting from reality and meeting the practical requirements of war; being frugal, self-reliant in building the People's Army. At the same time, it is necessary to organize and implement well the tasks and solutions on: Party building work in the People's Army; political education work, ideological leadership for cadres, employees, and logistics soldiers at all levels; building a contingent of logistics cadres and employees; rectifying the organization and staffing of the system of agencies, units, and logistics facilities; Management, construction of technical facilities, materials, and logistics equipment.

That policy is the loyalty and creative application of Marxist-Leninist theory, Ho Chi Minh's thought on war and the army, on the rear and logistics in war, on building revolutionary armed forces; inheriting and developing the experience of organizing logistics and building the revolutionary armed forces of the nation and the world into the specific conditions in the final stage of the Vietnamese people's revolutionary and industrialization movement.

2. To implement the above policy, the Military Delegation regularly follows the reality and closely directs all aspects of work: building the organizational system, staffing of agencies, units, and logistics facilities; building a team of logistics officers, employees, and soldiers; building logistics technical facilities. In particular, the Military Delegation has focused on directing the good implementation of key stages and central tasks in building forces, creating breakthroughs to continuously maintain and strengthen the strength of the People's Army, ensuring that the People's Army is always strong in all aspects and excellently completes assigned tasks.

3. From the process of the Party Central Committee leading the construction of the LLHC in the years (1969 - 1975), the thesis makes comments on the advantages and limitations in the fields of policy planning, practical guidance and results of building the LLHC in practice. At the same time, it clarifies the objective and subjective causes of those advantages and limitations, in which the subjective causes are the main ones.

4. Summarizing the process of the Party's leadership in building the People's Public Security Forces during the 1969-1975 revolution, the thesis draws four experiences: constantly maintaining and strengthening the Party's leadership over the People's Public Security Forces; always taking care to build a strong logistics cadre team to meet the requirements of the war; relying on the people, mobilizing and organizing the entire population to participate in building the People's Public Security Forces; being diligent, frugal, and self-reliant in building the People's Public Security Forces. These four experiences have reference value and are applicable in leading the building of the People's Public Security Forces today.

Building the People's Public Security Forces to meet the requirements of the task of defending the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the new situation is an important, difficult and complicated task. It requires the Party, State and people of Vietnam to continue to thoroughly grasp the revolutionary offensive ideology, actively, proactively and creatively mobilize all possible resources to build a strong and comprehensive People's Public Security Forces, and successfully complete all tasks.

LIST OF AUTHOR'S PUBLISHED WORKS RELATED TO THE THESIS

1. Nguyen Huu Hoat (2011), "The role of logistics work in the resistance war against America to save the country", Journal of Party History, No. 2 (243), pp. 58 - 61.

2. Nguyen Huu Hoat (2011), "Some experiences drawn from political and ideological education for military logistics forces in the General Offensive and Uprising in Spring 1975", Journal of Military Logistics Science Research , No. 38 (65), pp. 14 - 19.

3. Nguyen Huu Hoat (2012), "Ho Chi Minh's viewpoint on military logistics - theoretical and practical significance", Journal of Party History, No. 2 (255), pp. 30 - 34.

4. Nguyen Huu Hoat (2012), "The role of the Northern rear in the resistance war against the US to save the country - Historical and realistic significance", Journal of Military Logistics Science Research , No. 46 (73), pp. 81 - 85.

5. Nguyen Huu Hoat (2013), "The Party's experience in the national logistics work in the resistance war against the US to save the country", Journal of Party History, No. 4 (269), pp. 15 - 19.

6. Nguyen Huu Hoat (2013), "Building and promoting the political and spiritual factors of the army logistics force in the resistance war against the US to save the country - historical and realistic values", Military Logistics Magazine , No. 2 (649), pp. 45 - 47.

7. Nguyen Huu Hoat (2013), "Applying President Ho Chi Minh's viewpoint of building a "politically strong" Army as a basis in building the current Army logistics force", Journal of Military Logistics Science Research , No. 5 (163), pp. 28 - 31, 15.

8. Nguyen Huu Hoat (2014), "The failure of the US on the logistics front in the war of aggression against Vietnam through the eyes of the US", Military History Magazine , No. 274 (October 2014), pp. 45 - 49.

9. Nguyen Huu Hoat (2015), "The Party's policy on logistics work in the resistance war against America to save the country", Journal of Military Political Theory Education , No. 2 (150), pp. 14 - 16.

10. Nguyen Huu Hoat (2015), "Experience in building logistics forces of the Army Party Committee in the years 1969 - 1973 and application in building logistics forces today", Military Science Journal , No. 08 (August 2015), pp. 86 - 90.

The Party Committee of the Army led the building of logistics forces in the resistance war against the US to save the country from 1969 to 1975 - 20

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